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A. Freedom of Expression: A Complex Freedom
Both the doctrine and the judges of the European Court of Human Rights (the
"Strasbourg Court" or "court") seem to derive pleasure from the complexity inherent in
the right to freedom of expression guaranteed by Article 10 of the European
Convention on Human Rights ("Convention").' This complexity stems from several
factors, including the text of Article 10 itself.2 The text defines several components of
the "right to freedom of expression," including the freedom to express one's opinion,
the freedom to communicate information, and the freedom to receive information a In
* Professor at the University of Paris II (Panth6on-Assas). This Article was originally
written in French and delivered as a conference paper at a symposium held by the Center for
American Law of the University of Paris II (Panth6on-Assas) on January 18-19, 2008. For the
French version of this Article, see Jean-Frangois Flauss, La Cour europienne des droits de
I 'homme et la libertd d'expression, in LA LIBERTE D'ExPREssioN AuX ETATS-uNIs ET EN EUROPE
97 (tlisabeth Zoller ed., 2008). Many thanks to Patrice Van Hyle-B.A. University of
Wisconsin-Milwaukee, M.A. Institute of French Studies at New York University-for her
translation.
1. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 10,
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221,230 [hereinafter European Convention on Human Rights]. See
generally MALCOLM NATHAN SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 321 (5th ed. 2002); Frangoise
Tulkens, Judge at the European Court of Human Rights, Freedom of Expression and
Information in a Democratic Society and the Right to Privacy Under the European Convention
on Human Rights: A Comparative Look at Articles 8 and 10 of the Convention in the Case-Law
of the European Court of Human Rights, Presentation Before the Council of Europe Conference
on Freedom of Expression and the Right to Privacy (Sept. 23, 1999), available at
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/media/DOC/DH-MM(2000)007-en.asp.
2. Article 10 provides that
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include
freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas
without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article
shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television
or cinema enterprises.
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and
responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or
penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in
the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the
protection of the reputation or the rights of others, for preventing the disclosure
of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and
impartiality of the judiciary.
European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 1, at art. 10.
3. Id.
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other words, the Convention upholds several "freedoms of speech," not just one. The
second factor of complexity is its cross-border character, even though the Strasbourg
Court and the previous Commission have succeeded in limiting the extraterritorial
effect of their sphere of control relative to Article 10.
4
However, the main reason for this complexity is undoubtedly the notion of "duties
and responsibilities" set forth in Article 10(2). This provision is unique in the
Convention. It does not appear in any other Article of the Convention, and is most
notably absent from the Articles containing restrictions clauses. The obligation of the
person possessing the right to freedom of speech to take into consideration his or her
"duties and responsibilities" was written into the Convention not only to take account
of the distinctive identity of the freedom of speech, but also to prevent the irresponsible
and dangerous use of democracy.5
Finally, the complexity found within the right to freedom of expression owes much
to the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court. The case law is the work not only of the
Grand Chamber but of all the chambers. In the absence of sufficient coordination
among the different chambers as well as systemized harmonization by the Grand
Chamber, the imperative to achieve a level of cohesiveness in European jurisprudence
is not strong. It is perhaps even less so given that the method of control used by the
Strasbourg Court is pragmatic and empirical in nature.
Beyond guiding principles, litigation surrounding freedom of speech is similar to a
branching case-study tree (far removed from the method of categorization practiced by
the United States Supreme Court).6 Under these conditions, an author could rightly
evoke the image of "a tightrope walker using democratic society as his point of
reference yet whose characteristics are defined by the court in reality on a case-by-case
basis through its legal case law.",
7
4. See Ben El Mahi v. Denmark, App. No. 5853/06 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Dec. 11, 2006),
http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ (click "case-law" then "HUDOC," select "decisions" on the left-
hand column, and search for the application number) (concluding that infringing other rights
guaranteed by the Convention derived from freedom of speech are not deemed within the
competence of the European Court because the injured parties do not fall within the jurisdiction
of a signatory member state according to the terms of Article 1); Bertrand Russell Peace Found.
v. United Kingdom, App. No. 7597/76, 14 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 117, 123-24 (1978)
(concluding that member states were under no affirmative obligation to ensure protection
against infringements of freedom of speech when the latter is exercised across an international
border).
5. Csaba Pdkozdy, Les effets de la deuxi~me guerre mondiale dans lajurisprudence de la
Cour Europdenne des Droits de 1 'Homme sur la libert6 d'expression, in L'HISTOIRE EN DROIT
INTERNATIONAL 365 (Pdter KovAcs ed. 2004).
6. See Daniel A. Farber, The Categorical Approach to Protecting Speech in American
Constitutional Law, 84 IND. L.J. 917 (2009); Elisabeth Zoller, The United States Supreme Court
and the Freedom of Expression, 84 IND. L.J. 885 (2009).
7. PIERRE-FRAN oIs DOCQUIR, VARIABLES El VARIATIONS DE LA LIBERT D'EXPRESSION EN
EUROPE ET AUX ETATS-UNIS 4 (2007).
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B. Freedom of Speech: A Valued Freedom
1. The Sources of Inspiration Behind the Promotion of This Freedom
Judged by the yardstick of time, the policy of the court within the domain of
freedom of expression demonstrates support for the values of the "open society"
promulgated by Karl Popper.8 The attachment to this ideological stance has grown
stronger since the middle of the 1980s, notably with the presence inside the court of
judges elected on account of "new European democracies." The judges, often having
diplomas from American universities and sometimes even academic experience
overseas, have promoted the legal precedents set by the United States Supreme Court
relating to "freedom of expression" to a preferential source of inspiration.
In actuality, express references to the case law of the United States Supreme Court
date back, at least within various separate opinions, before the expansion of the
jurisdiction of the Strasbourg Court. 9 But over the last decade, the attention paid by
European judges to American legal precedent has become more insistent.'0 The
influence of American law on certain aspects of European case law with respect to
"freedom of speech" is obvious. However, it manifests mostly in an indirect and
discreet manner." 1 For the time being, it is only by exception that the Strasbourg Court
refers to a United States Supreme Court ruling within the very text of its own ruling.
2
2. The Tools of Promotion
i. The Doctrine of Procedural Guarantees Inherent in Substantial Rights
The Strasbourg Court's recognition that procedural guarantees are inherent in
substantial rights protected by the Convention emerges from a well-established policy
of stare decisis. However, it is only recently that the court handed down a decision
explicitly regarding the level of procedural guarantees arising from Article 10(1) of the
Convention. In this case, the Grand Chamber established a link of equivalence between
8. See generally KARL R. POPPER, 1 THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIEs (1945)
(suggesting that the values of "open society" include the virtues of the widest debate possible,
the importance of nonconformist ideas, and opinions which are regarded as a factor of progress
in democratic society and as a guarantee of the authenticity of a democratic society).
9. For pioneering opinions referencing U.S. law, see Observer & Guardian v. United
Kingdom, 216 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 61 (1991) (Morenilla, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); Groppera Radio AG v. Switzerland, 173 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 36 (1990)
(Pettiti, J., dissenting); Barthold v. Germany, 90 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 32 (1985) (Pettiti, J.,
concurring).
10. See, e.g., Sflrek v. Turkey (No. 1), 1999-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 353, 394 (Bonello, J.
dissenting).
11. See Jean-Frangois Flauss, La prdsence de la Jurisprudence de la Cour Supreme de
Etats-Unis D'Amerique dans le Contentieux Europien des Droits de I'Homme, 62 REVUE
TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROITS DE L'HOMME 313, 314-15 (2003) (Belg.); see also Antoine Masson,
De la possible influence de WO. Holmes sur la conception de la libert6 d'expression dans la
Convention europeenne de droits de l'homme, 83 REVUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL COMPARE
232, 233-48 (2006) (Belg.).
12. But see Appleby v. United Kingdom, 2003-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 189, 194-95.
2009]
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the levels of procedural protection offered by Articles 6 and 10.13 But the choice
upholding the procedural guarantees of Article 6 to constitute a maximum standard in
the domain of freedom of expression has been criticized: "[W]hat can normally be
tolerated from the point of view of due process according to the fair-trial rules laid
down in Article 6 may not be acceptable when it is a matter of verifying whether an
interference with freedom of expression is 'necessary in a democratic society."'" 4
ii. The Doctrine of Affirmative Obligations
As in litigation relative to other rights upheld by the Convention, the doctrine of the
state's "affirmative obligations" was employed in view of the horizontal effect of
freedom of speech. 5 The guarantees of Article 10 can be invoked within the
framework of individual relations: the State has the obligation to protect the freedom of
expression against attacks coming from private individuals.' 6 Such a requirement is
based on the state's affirmative obligation established in Article 1 of the Convention.17
However, attributing a horizontal effect to the freedom of speech, via the protection of
private obligations, is not systematically practiced by the Strasbourg Court.' 8
Relying on the doctrine of affirmative obligations is also justified by the court's
desire to increase the degree of protection afforded to the freedom of speech. In this
way, the Strasbourg Court can place an affirmative obligation on the state that is both
material and procedural.' 9 When the doctrine of affirmative obligations is invoked for
the purpose of new, material components of the freedom of speech, the court adopts a
moderate attitude. Thus, while it has recognized an ideological association's official
right to broadcast a message of protest regarding certain breeding practices of animals
destined for human consumption on a Swiss television station,2 ° the court has
categorically refused to grant the right to broadcast religious messages over public and
private radio in Ireland. 21 Likewise, it has rejected recognizing a right, based on Article
13. See Steel v. United Kingdom, 2005-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 38 ("The lack of procedural
fairness and equality therefore gave rise to a breach of Article 10 in the present case.").
14. Perna v. Italy, 2003-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 333, 360 (Conforti, J., dissenting).
15. See Fuentes Bobo v. Spain, App. No. 39293/98, 31 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1115 (2001); see
also Patrick Morvan, A Comparison of the Freedom of Speech of Workers in French and
American Law, 84 IND. L.J. 1015, 1023, 1026-27 (2009).
16. See Shabanov v. Russia, App. No. 5433/02 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Dec. 14, 2007),
http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ (click "case-law" then "HUDOC," select "decisions" on the left-
hand column, and search for the application number); Fuentes Bobo, 31 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 1115.
17. See VgT Verein Gegen Tierfabriken v. Switzerland, App. No. 24699/94 (Eur. Ct. H.R.
June 28, 2001), http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ (click "case-law" then "HUDOC," select
"decisions" on the left-hand column, and search for the application number).
18. See Perna, 2003-V Eur. Ct. H.R. at 360 (Conforti, J. dissenting).
19. Ozgiir GUndem v. Turkey, 2000-Ill Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 21 (holding that in failing to either
adequately protect a pro-Kurdish newspaper or investigate criminal activity directed against the
paper, the Turkish government failed to meet its positive obligation to ensure the newspaper's
freedom of expression).
20. VgT Verein Gegen Tierfabriken, App. No. 24699/94.
21. Murphy v. Ireland, 2003-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 1,31 (holding that the Radio and Television
Act of 1988 did not, by proscribing the broadcast of religious and political advertisements,
unreasonably limit the applicant's freedom of expression).
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10 of the Convention, to access information to be used against public authorities, while
nevertheless indirectly protecting this right through Article 8.22
3. The Doctrine of "Discretionary Powers"
Serving as standards, or as a form of control of the "necessity" of restrictive
measures introduced or tolerated by states relative to the freedom of expression,
"discretionary powers" are by definition a means of favoring-in casu (in case of
extreme necessity)-the Strasbourg Court's freedom of assessment and, consequently,
authorizing its possible manipulation. A praetorian construction, "discretionary
powers" are subject to the context of the matter to settle, but also depend on the
various personalities of the judges involved.23 The multiplicity of variables analyzed in
order to balance restrictions placed on the freedom of expression effectively offers the
European judge wide powers of flexibility in terms of the interests at issue, especially
within the framework of a jurisprudential and jurisdictional policy based on the
"special case." Nevertheless, there is a strong tendency-which has grown over the
years-to reduce or even neutralize the member states' discretionary powers.
From the outset, it should be clarified that a policy aiming to reduce discretionary
powers does not follow a linear projection. The return to broader discretionary powers
within a particular scenario is conceivable. But structurally, discretionary powers tend
to diminish and in some instances even disappear altogether once the court deems that
the basic values of a democratic society are at stake.24 From this, it follows logically
that as the court pays an increasing amount of attention to these basic values, European
control becomes more thorough. The passage from "certain discretionary powers" to
"restricted discretionary powers" is a tangible sign of such a reduction in the
Strasbourg Court's powers.
25
C. Freedom of Speech: A Fundamental Freedom
Litigation surrounding the freedom of speech contributed significantly to the overall
development of European jurisprudence throughout the 1960s. In its position as "the
crossroads of freedom," freedom of speech is often a participating player in litigation
22. See Guerra v. Italy, 1998-1 Eur. Ct. H.R. 210, 226.
23. This issue causes certain judges to note that "it is difficult to ascertain what principles
determine the scope" of the Strasbourg Court's discretionary powers in litigation over the
freedom of speech. See Wingrove v. United Kingdom, 1996-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 1937, 1966
(L6hmus, J., dissenting).
24. For a detailed demonstration in this context, see Patrick Wachsmann, Une certaine
marge d'apprdciation: Considdrations sur les variations du contr6le europden en mati~re de
libertd d'expression, in LES DROrrS DE L'HOMME AU SEUIL DU TROISIEAME MLL.NAIRE: MEANGES
EN HOMMAGE A PIERRE LAMBERT 1015 (2000).
25. For an example of an apparent contradiction in applying broad control, see Radio
France v. France, App. No. 53984/00 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Mar. 30, 2004),
http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ (click "case-law" then "HUDOC," select "decisions" on the left-
hand column, and search for the application number) (recognizing that although a member
state's discretionary power is limited, France's imposition of a unique penalty for defamation
fell within that power).
20091
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concerning other rights-such as political rights, the freedom of assembly, the freedom
to demonstrate, and the freedom of association. 26 Considered one of the primordial
conditions for the progress of democratic society, freedom of speech has historically
benefited from this fundamental assumption of democratic society.27 This qualification
has not formally bestowed freedom of speech with a hierarchical standing above other
freedoms guaranteed by the Convention, but it has underscored the close link between
freedom of speech and democratic society. In fact, freedom of expression is not only a
subjective right of the individual against the State, but is also an objective fundamental
principle for life in a democracy. That is, it is not an end unto itself, but a means
toward the establishment of a democratic society; freedom of speech is necessary for
the full development of social democratic ideals. 28 But, correlatively, the demands of
democratic society necessitate a proper channeling of freedom of speech.29
I. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND THE FULL DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC
IDEALS
According to the famous language repeatedly invoked by the Strasbourg Court, a
"democratic society" is based on pluralism, tolerance, and open-mindedness-30-m
short, an entire set of cardinal values. While it is natural that these values permeate the
exercise of freedom of expression, the latter comprises a vehicle that concomitantly
concretizes these same values. An essential element of"democratic" society, according
to the Strasbourg Court's jurisprudence, is the existence of public confidence in public
institutions and authorities. 31 Yet, confidence cannot exist without transparency. It is
not surprising, then, that freedom of expression has been utilized in the democratic
control of public powers.
A. Freedom of Expression Employed to Promote the Values of Democratic Society
Following the example of American law, the Strasbourg Court is fundamentally
preoccupied with safeguarding, and if necessary, extending, the public space available
for free and open discussion integral to democracy.32 This concern has become a
guiding principle of the court's jurisprudential policy, resulting in a structural
promotion of the right to discussion and debate. It also explains the attention paid to
protecting the manner of expression. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, it
constitutes the determining factor behind provisions relating to the exercise of freedom
of expression that are more or less incompatible with rule of law imperatives.
26. For an illustration, see Socialist Party v. Turkey, 1998-1I1 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1233, 1255
("The protection of opinions and the freedom to express them is one of the objectives of the
freedoms of assembly and association as enshrined in Article I.").
27. See Handyside v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1976).
28. See infra Part 1.
29. See infra Part II.
30. See Handyside, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 23.
31. See De Haes v. Belgium, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. 198 (1997).
32. For a detailed discussion, see Patrick Wachsmann, Participation, Communication,
Pluralismi, 13 L'AcTuALrrT JuRmDIQuE DRorr ADMINITRATIF (SPECIAL IssuE) 165 (1998) (Fr.).
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1. Promotion of the Right to Discussion and Debate
"The devil is in the details." Although overused in the legal world, this adage
perfectly characterizes the "manipulation" that the Strasbourg Court has resorted to in
order to import two key notions that can contribute to the public forum of free
discussion-by enhancing the ability to discuss. At issue are the two notions of
"general interest or public debate" and "value judgment."
i. Stretching the Notion of a "General Interest or Public Debate"
The extent of the state's recognized power of restriction is structurally dependent
upon the contribution the speech or message makes to a general interest or public
debate. The existence of a general interest debate leads ipsofacto to a strengthening of
European control. The same goes for political discourse-the Strasbourg Court, in
effect, refuses to distinguish between political discussion and discussion of other
matters of public concern or to establish any form of hierarchical ranking.33 Moreover,
political controversy contributes by its very nature to general interest debates.34 Since
the court places general debate at the heart of "democratic society," it is also seemingly
disposed to granting it additional attention in cases where general debate has the
capacity to favor the progress of democratic society. 35 The evolution of European
jurisprudence is characterized by a manifest tendency to stretch the notion of what
constitutes a general interest debate. The very sectoral and/or local character of the
issue being debated does not constitute a reason for disqualification from the
category. 36 But the broadening of the concept of a general interest debate is
demonstrated, above all, by extending beyond its natural borders. In this context, the
court bases its analysis on the mixed character of the message-for example, when it
partially deconstructs commercial or professional language.
Initially, commercial or professional messages, especially those in the form of
advertisements, were not considered to belong to the category of general interest
debates. 37 At that time, a contingent ofjudges declared themselves very much in favor
of an approach to this type of litigation that was based upon the right of competition.
33. See Thorgeirson v. Iceland, 239 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 27 (1992).
34. See Filatenko v. Russia, App. No. 73219/01 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Dec. 6, 2007),
http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ (click "case-law" then "HUDOC," select "decisions" on the left-
hand column, and search for the application number) (finding that the opinions and information
disseminated during electoral campaigns falls ipsofacto within the category of general interest
debates).
35. See Giniewski v. France, App. No. 64016/00 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Jan. 31, 2006),
http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ (click "case-law" then "HUDOC," select "decisions" on the left-
hand column, and search for the application number).
36. See Boldea v. Romania, App. No. 19997/02 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 15, 2007),
http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ (click "case-law" then "HUDOC," select "decisions" on the left-
hand column, and search for the application number) (stating that a debate held during a
meeting of a university department faculty on the incidence of plagiarism in scientific
publications was attributable to several department colleagues).
37. See Jacubowski v. Germany, 291 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 3, 13-15 (1994); Casado Coca
v. Spain, 285 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 3, 20 (1994); Markt Intern Verlag GmbH v. Germany, 165
Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 19-21 (1989).
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More recently, the court has found that commercial or professional language that
pertains to the realm of public health issues constitutes a general interest debate. 38 At
the same time, the court recognizes that the advertising dimensions of professional
publications may contribute to general interest debates as well as contribute general
advertising information to the public. 39 Taking into account this dual-sided aspect of a
commercial message is even more obvious when it has political connotations,
particularly those emanating from environmental or "green" organizations. 40 On a
grand scale, environmental criticisms of economic and/or commercial practices are
considered general interest debates. In fact, the court expressly recognizes the general
interest served by the right to freely disseminate information and ideas regarding the
activities of powerful business corporations, particularly multinational companies. 4' It
has expressed the opinion that the strategy of a private company could in fact comprise
an issue of general interest.42
The expansion of the concept of a general interest debate is further shown by the
evolution of the terminology used by the Strasbourg Court. In fact, alongside the stricto
sensu general interest debate, there is also European jurisprudence's recognition of lato
sensu general interest debates, or those that are in reality public interest debates, but of
less importance. Such is the case when the court makes reference to "a problem the
public ha[s] an interest in being informed about. '"43 Additional hurdles need to be
crossed when the court evokes the notion of a quasi general interest debate.44
In summary, the legal category of general interest debates is comprised of several
stages ranging from the crescendo of a general interest debate of extreme importance45
to a debate of lesser public interest.
ii. The Extensive Approach to the Concept of a "Value Judgment"
The distinction between a declaration of fact and a value judgment occupies an
essential place in the Article 10 jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court. Indeed, while
the reality of the first can be proven, the second does not lend itself to a demonstration
38. Hertel v. Switzerland, 1998-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 2298, 2330.
39. For an application of this concept to medical information, see Stambuk v. Germany,
App. No. 37928/97 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 17, 2002), http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ (click "case-
law" then "HUDOC," select "decisions" on the left-hand column, and search for the application
number).
40. See Vgt Verein Gegen Tierfabriken v. Switzerland, App. No. 24699/99 (Eur. Ct. H.R.
June 28, 2001), http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ (click "case-law" then "HUDOC," select
"decisions" on the left-hand column, and search for the application number).
41. Steel v. United Kingdom, 2005-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 36-37.
42. Goodwin v. United Kingdom, 1996-Il Eur. Ct. H.R. 483.
43. Tongsbergs Blad A/S v. Norway, App. No. 510/04 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Mar. 1, 2007),
http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ (click "case-law" then "HUDOC," select "decisions" on the left-
hand column, and search for the application number) (assessing the public's need for
information regarding a well-known industrialist's disregard for a housing regulation).
44. See Karhuvaara v. Finland, 2004-X Eur. Ct. H.R. 259,261 ("[T]he contested articles
did not have an express bearing on political issues and were not of great public interest ... ").
45. See, e.g., Mam~re v. France, App. No. 12697/03 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Nov. 7, 2007),
http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ (click "case-law" then "HUDOC," select "decisions" on the left-
hand column, and search for the application number).
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of its accuracy.46 In other words, the choice of whether a statement constitutes a
declaration of fact or a value judgment is a deciding factor in determining the level of
protection afforded to comments that have been expressed-a value judgment will
benefit from wide protection, almost absolute, as long as the opinion put forward is not
devoid of any factual basis and was made in good faith.47 For the purpose of ensuring
maximum protection of the freedom of expression, especially in the domain of political
discourse or general interest debates, European judges are increasingly prone to opt for
an expansive reading of the notion of a value judgment.4 8 In actuality, the Strasbourg
Court gives the impression of wanting to erase the operative interest of the distinction
between the two determinations of law. On the one hand, the court considers value
judgments to have the reputation of being less important within the framework of a
lively political debate. On the other hand, the court identifies an intermediate category:
the remark that without a value determination cannot be likened stricto sensu to a
factual declaration. In such a case, it is a matter of the obviously not unreasonable
interpretation given the factual basis of the contentious allegation.49
In part, the extensive approach to the concept of a value judgment must be tied to
the lack of confidence that is behind the practice of courts in certain European
countries, both Eastern and Western. This is shown by their tendency to favor a
deliberately restrictive conception of a value judgment50 or by their pure and simple
ignorance of the distinction between the two notions.5' If the flexibility of the concept
of a value judgment is undeniably at the service of social democratic ideals, then its use
46. Lingens v. Austria, 103 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A.) 11, 28 (1986).
47. See Brasilier v. France, App. No. 71343/01 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Apr. 11, 2006),
http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ (click "case-law" then "HUDOC," select "decisions" on the left-
hand column, and search for the application number); Jerusalem v. Austria, 2001-Il Eur. Ct.
H.R. 69, 84; De Haes v. Belgium, 1997-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 198, 235-36.
48. See, e.g., Lepojic v. Serbia, App. No. 13909/05 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Nov. 6, 2007),
http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ (click "case-law" then "HUDOC," select "decisions" on the left-
hand column, and search for the application number); Ferihumer v. Austria, App. No. 30547/03
(Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 1, 2007), http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ (click "case-law" then "HUDOC,"
select "decisions" on the left-hand column, and search for the application number); Paturel v.
France, App. No. 54968/00 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Dec. 22, 2005), http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ (click
"case-law" then "HUDOC," select "decisions" on the left-hand column, and search for the
application number).
49. Lombardo v. Malta, App. No. 7333/06 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Apr. 24, 2007),
http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ (click "case-law" then "HUDOC," select "decisions" on the left-
hand column, and search for the application number).
50. See Karman v. Russia, App. No. 29372/02 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Dec. 14, 2007),
http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ (click "case-law" then "HUDOC," select "decisions" on the left-
hand column, and search for the application number); Krasulya v. Russia, App. No. 12365/03
(Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 22, 2007), http://www.echr.coe.int/echr (click "case-law" then "HUDOC,"
select "decisions" on the left-hand column, and search for the application number); Feldek v.
Slovakia, 2001-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 85, 109.
51. Gorelishvili v. Georgia, App. No. 12979/04 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 5, 2007),
http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ (click "case-law" then "HUDOC," select "decisions" on the left-
hand column, and search for the application number).
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is not always the most coherent. A good example of this is the favor accorded by the
court to the freedom of historical debate.52
2. The Importance Given to Freedom of the Manner of Expression
As to be expected amidst the "pluralism, tolerance, and open-mindedness" inherent
in democratic society, "freedom of expression . . . is applicable not only to
'information' or 'ideas' that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a
matter of indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb. 53 Extending this
theme, which has been repeated ad nauseam for four decades, the Strasbourg Court
very soundly recognizes the right to the expression of opinions that may be considered
outlandish in nature. 54 Freedom within the realm of choice of language and manner of
expression is evident by the official recognition of the right to shock.55 It remains to be
seen whether the right to shock is limited to controversies rooted in contemporary
debates, as the court seems to imply, 56 or whether it is perhaps necessary to admit that
the right to shock is generally applicable whenever it concerns a matter of general
interest. In any case, the court has clearly favored defending shocking language and
free expression within the world of artistic creation.
7
The right to exaggeration and provocation constitutes an inherent component of
political discourse. As a consequence, polemic58 and sarcastic59 language is tolerated
52. Giniewski v. France, App. No. 64016/00 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Jan. 31, 2006),
http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ (click "case-law" then "HUDOC," select "decisions" on the left-
hand column, and search for the application number) (noting that contentious remarks
qualifying as a value judgment can legitimately be understood as resting upon unestablished
historic fact); Lehideux v. France, 1998-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. 2864, 2883-84 (noting that a
publication containing a value judgment on Philippe PMtain's policy during World War II
concealed well-established historic facts regarding the Holocaust).
53. Hertel v. Switzerland, 1998-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 2298, 2329.
54. Id. at 2332 ("It matters little that [the] opinion is a minority one and may appear to be
devoid of merit since, in a sphere in which it is unlikely that any certainty exists, it would be
particularly unreasonable to restrict freedom of expression only to generally accepted ideas.").
55. See, e.g., Giniewski, App. No. 64016/00 (protecting the freedom of expression in the
context of a publication charging the Catholic Church, or at least its hierarchy, with
responsibility in the genocide of the Jewish population by Nazi Germany).
56. See id.
57. See Vereinigung Bildender Kiinstler v. Austria, App. No. 68354/01 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Jan.
25, 2007), http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ (click "case-law" then "HUDOC," select "decisions"
on the left-hand column, and search for the application number). This judgment, handed down
with only a one-vote majority, specifies that exaggeration, distortion of reality, and provocation
(in cases where applied to theater scenes having risqu6 sexual connotations) are components of
satire, a recognized form of artistic expression and social commentary. Ruling in such away, the
Strasbourg Court distanced itself considerably from the attitude it had formerly adopted with
regard to artistically obscene messages. See Mfiller v. Switzerland, 133 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at
22-23 (1988).
58. See Lopes Gomes da Silva v. Portugal, 2000-X Eur. Ct. H.R. 101 (analyzing a
publication that described a local candidate in a municipal election as being "grotesque" and
"buffoonish" as well as "an incredible mixture of crude reactionaryism... , fascist bigotry[,]
and coarse anti-Semitism").
59. See Katrami v. Greece, App. No. 19331/05 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Dec. 6, 2007)
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and even fully accepted. Moreover, as is frequently recalled by the court, "in the
domain of political discourse, the invective often touches upon a personal note; these
are the occupational hazards of the game of politics and part and parcel of the open
debate of ideas, the guarantors of a democratic society." 6 That is to say, using
excessive and/or extreme language is broadly understood to be accepted, particularly in
discussions of political issues. 6 1 The same basically applies, although maybe not
entirely, to militant discussions that are not strictly political-primarily to
environmentalist discourse.
62
The court did, however, establish a system of boundaries to the freedom and manner
of expression. The first boundary relates to the object of the discourse and determines
whether the language is, by its very nature, illicit.63 The second boundary concerns the
purpose of the discourse and suggests that sensationalism is not a legitimate purpose. 64
Finally, the third boundary is concerned with the effects of the language. This
boundary prevents the right to ridicule from leading to the gratuitous insult of others.
The liberal attitude adopted by the court with regard to a speaker's right to
exaggeration and provocation-to the extent that it ends up validating manifest abuses
of freedom of speech (for example, by legitimizing a right to insult)--is sometimes
considered as bordering on laxity. One might certainly agree with the Strasbourg Court
that language such as "beasts in uniform," "wild beasts in uniform," and "sadistic
brutes" uttered against police officers suspected of brutality falls short of the threshold
of an insult.65 On the contrary, the court considered the use of extremely pejorative
terms-including vulgar double entendres and sexual references-against an
archbishop, who had proposed banning a film he considered profane and blasphemous,
insulting.
66
The debate over the existence of a right to insult was fueled by litigation initiated by
Austria in connection with the penal suppression of scathing criticisms made against
political members and sympathizers of a far-right ideological movement. Calling a
http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ (click "case-law" then "HUDOC," select "decisions" on the left-
hand column, and search for the application number) (analyzing the use of the word "clown" to
describe an elected official).
60. Sanocki v. Poland, App. No. 28949/03 (Eur. Ct. H.R. July 17, 2007),
http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ (click "case-law" then "HUDOC," select "decisions" on the left-
hand column, and search for the application number).
61. In this way, certain expressions such as "mayor thief," Dabrowski v. Poland, App. No.
18235/02 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Dec. 19, 2006), http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ (click "case-law" then
"HUDOC," select "decisions" on the left-hand column, and search for the application number),
or "pollution mayor," Desjardin v. France, App. No. 22567/03 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Nov. 22, 2007),
http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ (click "case-law" then "HUDOC," select "decisions" on the left-
hand column, and search for the application number), were deemed acceptable in light of the
determining law factor.
62. See Steel v. United Kingdom, 2005-Il Eur. Ct. H.R. 3, 88.
63. See infra Part II.A.
64. For a recent and solemn reminder, see Stoll v. Switzerland, App. No. 69698/01 (Eur.
Ct. H.R. Dec. 10, 2007), http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ (click "case-law" then "HUDOC," select
"decisions" on the left-hand column, and search for the application number).
65. Thorgeirson v. Iceland, 239 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 17 (1992).
66. See Klein v. Slovakia, App. No. 72208/01 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Dec. 31, 2006),
http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ (click "case-law" then "HUDOC," select "decisions" on the left-
hand column, and search for the application number).
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forefront leader of a far-right political party an "idiot" is not characteristically
polemical, according to the court, even though the term was openly used in place of
"Nazi," a taboo term in Austria.67 Based implicitly on Article 17 of the Convention,68
the right to insult is limited to adversaries of democratic society. When all is said and
done, it resembles a legitimate response to the provocative behavior of the implicated
political leader.69 Moreover, the court does nothing more than adhere to the guiding
principle of free speech litigation, namely the principle of reciprocity between the
"offender" and the "offended., 70
However, the right of retaliation, or reprisals, or both, on the part of the "offended"
person is not unconditional, even if it manifests in the response of a political figure
within the framework of a polemical debate.7 1 In a fairly recent case, the court
maintained its liberal approach toward the freedom of expression of political
adversaries, "enemies" of the Convention. Notwithstanding the defamatory nature of
the use of the term "Nazi" in Austria, the court allowed the phrase "closet Nazi" to be
uttered against a political leader whose position was very much in line with a party of
the extreme right and who was suspected of having pro-national-socialist sympathies.72
In the absence of a decision on point, the matter of a possible variation in the intensity
of the right to insult dependent upon the ideological stance of"enemies" of democratic
society remains open.
In view of the Strasbourg Court's jurisprudential policy supporting the free
formulation of language and speech, commentary regarding the dignity of the
information or expression is needed. Inquiry seems all the more legitimate as the court
pays closer attention to the protection of a person's dignity. In these conditions, can the
manner of one's expression be presented in an overly excessive form? There does not
seem to be sufficient consensus on this matter, as evidenced by the strong reactions of
67. Oberschlick v. Austria (No. 2), 1997-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 1266, 1270. But see id. at 1279
(Matscher, J., dissenting) (stating that the term used is an insult hurled for the purpose of
ridicule).
68. Article 17 of the Convention states, "Nothing in this Convention may be interpreted as
implying... any right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of
any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein or at their limitation to a greater extent than is
provided for in the Convention." European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 1, at art.
17.
69. See Sylvie Peyrou-Pistouley, L'extension regrettable de la libertg d'expression 6
l'insulte, 35 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROITS DE L'HOMME 593 (1998) (Belg.).
70. For an application of this principle within a different context, see generally Nilsen v.
Norway, 1999-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 57 (the virulent response from professional police associations
as a rejoinder to polemical comments made, bordering on insult, denouncing incidences of
abuse and police brutality; the exaggeration of the insinuation legitimizes the vehemence of the
retort). See also Arbeiter v. Austria, App. No. 3138/04 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Jan. 25, 2007),
http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ (click "case-law" then "HUDOC," select "decisions" on the left-
hand column, and search for the application number).
71. Walb v. Austria, No. 24773/94 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Mar. 21, 2000),
http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ (click "case-law" then "HUDOC," select "decisions" on the left-
hand column, and search for the application number) (stating that the use of the term "Nazi
journalism" by a member of Parliament to describe a newspaper was particularly stigmatizing in
light of the Austrian context).
72. Scharsach v. Austria, 2003-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 125.
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the minority judges in Vereinigung Bildender Kfinstler v. Austria.73 Without a doubt,
the figures implicated were "known" and some of them even "notorious." But, for this
reason alone, must they be deprived of the protection of their dignity? In reality, the
court, without being totally indifferent to this concern, did not wish to openly make the
matter a priority within its case law.74
3. The Revocation of Freedom of Speech Provisions that Contradict Rule of Law
Imperatives
While it may be the case that the Strasbourg Court has not condemned the principle
behind preventive systems of government, 75 it has done its best to contain prior
restraint or authorization by subjecting them to scrupulous and rigorous control.
However, the court has also been intent on neutralizing, with varying intensity, those
forms of government power considered excessive and belonging to a bygone era.
Disposed toward penalizing attacks against the inalienable rights protected by the
Convention, the court is generally reserved with regard to penal sanctions used to
suppress the abusive exercise of rights guaranteed by the Convention. This is extremely
noticeable when the freedom at stake is the freedom of expression. In light of the
nature of their mission, their professional activity, or both, those holding public office
either benefit from specific protection or are hindered by particular constraints. If the
court has not called into question the principle behind these derogatory adjustments
vis-a-vis the exercise of freedom of expression, it has set out to undermine them.
i. Hostility Toward Excessive Systems of Government
At the beginning of the 1990s, when the Strasbourg Court declared that the French
tax administration's right of preemption in relation to costly real estate transfers was in
opposition to the Convention, it highlighted the excessive character of this procedure
which, in its eyes, resembled a prerogative belonging to a police state. 6 Since then,
there has been a tendency in European jurisprudence to systematically challenge legal
systems allowing infringements of rights guaranteed by the Convention when those
systems are viewed as excessive forms of government.77 In such a way, the court
condemned the French system of prior restraint applied to foreign publication, which
accorded significant discretionary power to the Minister of the Interior without
73. Vereinigung Bildender Kfinstlerv. Austria, No. 68354/01 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Jan. 25,2007),
http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ (click "case-law" then "HUDOC," select "decisions" on the left-
hand column, and search for the application number).
74. For an indirect consideration of this matter see Filipacchi v. France, No. 71111/01 (Eur.
Ct. H.R. June 14,2007), http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ (click "case-law" then "HUDOC," select
"decisions" on the left-hand column, and search for the application number).
75. Observer & Guardian v. United Kingdom, 216 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 30 (1991)
("Article 10 of the Convention does not in terms prohibit the imposition of prior restraints on
publication, as such.").
76. See Hentrich v. France, 296 Eur. Ct. H.R. 3, 19-20 (1994).
77. See also Patrick Wachsmann, De la qualit, de la loi ila qualitg du systemejuridique,
in 2 LIBERTtS, JUSTICE, TOLtRANCE: MtLANGES EN HOMMAGE AU DoYEN GERARD COHEN-
JONATHAN 1688, 1690 (2004).
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sufficient legislative checks in place to safeguard the procedural demands of the
Convention. 78 The court determined that, by its nature, "[s]uch legislation appears to be
in direct conflict with the actual wording of Article 10(1) of the Convention, which
provides that the rights set forth in that Article are secured 'regardless of frontiers."'
79
The court now considers this system anachronistic. "Although the exceptional
circumstances in 1939, on the eve of the Second World War, might have justified tight
control over foreign publications, the argument that a system that discriminated against
publications of that sort should continue to remain in force would appear to be
untenable. 80 The court reserved a similar fate for the French system of offenses
committed against a foreign head of state.8' The criticisms addressed against this
system, grounded in Article 10 of the Convention and more generally in the notion of a
democratic society, are as equally disparaging as those previously directed against the
foreign publications system. First and foremost, they underscore the extraordinary
protections granted to foreign heads of state, which forbid any criticism of them and
prevent the journalist, contrary to ordinary defamation law, from proving the truth of
his or her allegations.8 2 Now, according to the court, such a privilege is completely
archaic: it "cannot be reconciled with modem practice and political conceptions."
83
ii. Reservations Toward Penal Suppression
Generally speaking, the Strasbourg Court has shown itself to be quite guarded about
authorizing sanctions in the domain of freedom of speech. For example, it has been
reluctant to authorize pecuniary or other civil sanctions likely to have a dissuasive or
exorbitant effect in light of the limited financial resources of the convicted person. 
4
Playing a kind of balancing act, the court has developed a neutralizing jurisprudential
policy vis-A-vis civil sanctions, notably those declared on grounds of defamation.
85
Occasionally, the court even challenges the very principle behind the civil conviction.
86
Sometimes the court's reservations toward penal sanctions turn into outright
hostility and a thinly disguised attitude of distrust. Fundamentally, it is opposed to
penal sanctions involving prison sentences.87 By exception, the court admits the
78. Assoc. Ekin v. France, 2001-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 323,347-48.
79. Id. at 346.
80. Id.
81. Colombani v. France, 2002-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 25.
82. Id. at 36-37.
83. Id. at 44.
84. See Steel v. United Kingdom, 2005-Il Eur. Ct. H.R. 3.
85. For detailed examples, see Emmanuel Dreyer, Observations sur quelques applications
rcentes de l'article I Ode la Convention europenne (anvier 2006-janvier 2007), 71 REVUE
TRIMESTRJELLE DE DROrrS DE L'HOMME 615,633-35 (2007) (Belg.).
86. See Brasilier v. France, No. 71343/01 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Apr. 11, 2006),
http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ (click "case-law" then "HUDOC," select "decisions" on the left-
hand column, and search for the application number) (where plaintiff was fined one fianc for
damages as symbolic gesture); see also Giniewski v. France, App. No. 64016/00 (Eur. Ct. H.R.
Jan. 31, 2006), http://www.echr.coe.intlechr/ (click "case-law" then "HUDOC," select
"decisions" on the left-hand column, and search for the application number).
87. See, e.g., Kannellopoulou v. Greece, No. 28504/05 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 11, 2007),
http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ (click "case-law" then "HUDOC," select "decisions" on the left-
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conventionality of a custodial sentence "where other fundamental rights have been
seriously impaired, as, for example, in the case of hate speech or incitement to
violence."88 In other words, handing down a prison sentence is seen as ultima ratio,
and is tolerated only when the punished behavior is unbearable because it denies
fundamental principles of pluralist democracy.
8 9
The Strasbourg Court's attitude toward penal sanctions not involving prison
sentences is less black and white. Most recently, the court's jurisprudence has
confirmed the view that monetary fines imposed through penal channels do not conflict
with the demands of Article 10 of the Convention, at least in principle.90 Again, it
becomes appropriate in casu to offset the dissuasive effect inherent in any penal
sanction with the imposition of a low fine. By ruling in this way, the Grand Chamber
distances itself from the more liberal view shared by certain chambers of the court. In
fact, these chambers tend to consider, more or less openly according to the case, that
any penal sanction must be disallowed, whether in the form of a monetary fine91 or a
prison sentence. 92 As a consequence, the state must be satisfied merely with civil law
remedies. 93 Such an option rests on a partial neutralization of Article 10(2) of the
Convention, stipulating that the exercise of freedom of expression can be subject to
legal sanctions without specifying the penal or civil nature of the sanctions.
iii. Mistrust of Specific Privileges and Constraints Applicable to Public Office
Holders
Although the potential is great within the system of government immunity to
completely free its beneficiaries from having to respect the duties and responsibilities
incumbent upon speakers pursuant to Article 10(2) of the Convention, the Strasbourg
hand column, and search for the application number) (stating that the sentencing of the plaintiff
to a prison sentence, even a suspended sentence, constitutes a disproportionate punishment for
the crime within the framework of Article 10); Erbakan v. Turkey, No. 59405/00 (Eur. Ct. H.R.
July 6, 2006), http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ (click "case-law" then "HUDOC," select
"decisions" on the left-hand column, and search for the application number) (stating that the
nonenforcement of a prison sentence is not an attenuating circumstance for the defendant state).
88. Cumpana v. Romania, 2004-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 63, 95 (2004).
89. Karatepe v. Turkey, No. 41551/98 (Eur. Ct. H.R. July 31, 2007),
http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ (click "case-law" then "HUDOC," select "decisions" on the left-
hand column, and search for the application number).
90. Stoll v. Switzerland, No. 69698/01 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Dec. 10, 2007),
http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ (click "case-law" then "HUDOC," select "decisions" on the left-
hand column, and search for the application number).
91. See Falakaoglu v. Turkey, No. 11461/03 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Dec. 19, 2006),
http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ (click "case-law" then "HUDOC," select "decisions" on the left-
hand column, and search for the application number); Selisto v. Finland, No. 56767/00 (Eur. Ct.
H.R. Nov. 16, 2004), http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ (click "case-law" then "HUDOC," select
"decisions" on the left-hand column, and search for the application number).
92. Erdal Tas v. Turkey, No. 77650/01, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Dec. 19, 2006),
http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ (click "case-law" then "HUDOC," select "decisions" on the left-
hand column, and search for the application number).
93. Kannellopoulou v. Greece, No. 28504/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Oct. 11, 2007),
http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ (click "case-law" then "HUDOC," select "decisions" on the left-
hand column, and search for the application number).
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Court has endeavored, via the channel of a person's right to trial guaranteed by Article
6(1), to reduce the field of application of immunity, while remaining careful not to
undermine its substance. While the obligation ofpolitical and/or constitutional loyalty
(akin to a kind of super duty of confidentiality) required at times of certain public
office holders has not been ruled as being in opposition to the Convention, it has on the
other hand been seriously limited by the Strasbourg Court's jurisprudence. In contrast,
the attitude of the court clearly appears favorable to a possible limitation of the duty of
political confidentiality placed on government officials.
a. Reducing the Field of Application of Government Immunity
According to the Strasbourg Court, it is lawful for states to establish absolute civil
jurisdictional immunity guaranteeing legal authorities-notably members of the
government-freedom of speech in the public arena.94 The issue of immunity,
however, is strictly limited to the exercise of one's political mandate. Civil
jurisdictional immunity for members of government is no longer an "implicit
limitation" on the right to sue in court, as this protection--once ensured by Article 6(1)
of the Convention-has been removed. The right to trial enters into full effect when
immunity is invoked as cover for language or actions not strictly tied to the
performance of one's government functions.95 Thus, defamatory or offensive remarks
made by a senator during a political quarrel or in connection with political activity are
not considered to fall within the performance of one's government mandate. The same
goes for insulting remarks made during an electoral meeting. In passing, it should be
noted that the court displays particular mistrust toward political organs when they are
called upon to decide the legitimacy of invoking government immunity.96 In fact, the
court makes clear that in the event of such a scenario, its control must become
especially rigorous.
Considering the resolution upheld in A. v. United Kingdom, 97 immunity should not
cover negative comments made inside of Parliament even if they are only repeating
those already made within government walls. Likewise, it is not to be applied to
positions taken in the media in anticipation of negative comments made later by
Parliament.
b. Weakening the Obligations of Political Loyalty
Recently, the Strasbourg Court was led to endorse disciplinary action taken against
a German military officer for having breached his duty of confidentiality vis-A-vis the
constitution.98 The court's manner of ruling was based specifically on the fact that the
94. See Zollman v. United Kingdom, 2003-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 361, 376-81; A. v. United
Kingdom, 2002-X Eur. Ct. H.R. 119, 138-45.
95. See Cordova v. Italy (Cordova I), 2003-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 267,273-79; Cordova v. Italy
(Cordova 1), 2003-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 231, 242-49.
96. Cordova I, 2003-I Eur. Ct. H.R. at 248; De Jorio v. Italy, App. No. 73936/01 (Eur. Ct.
H.R. June 3, 2004), http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ (click "case-law" then "HUDOC," select
"decisions" on the left-hand column, and search for the application number).
97. 2002-X Eur. Ct. H.R. at 119.
98. See Erdel v. Germany, App. No. 30067/04 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 13, 2007),
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reserve officer belonged to a political party (classified as extreme right) and was
suspected of a breach of loyalty against the democratic and constitutional order of the
Federal Republic.
While in essence this decision of inadmissibility cannot be regarded as totally
negligible, it must certainly not be understood as calling into question the court's
jurisprudential policy of weakening the obligations of political loyalty incumbent upon
state officials. Moreover, the court itself is careful in casu to remove any hint of
contradiction with the principle handed down in the famous Vogt v. Germany
decision. 99 In that case, the court was quick to defend its stigmatization and, indeed,
condemnation on multiple accounts of the obligation of political loyalty placed on
German civil servants. It judged as unacceptable the overly absolute character of such
an obligation and bemoaned the fact that it "is owed equally by every civil servant,
regardless of his or her function and rank."100 The court continued: "It implies that
every civil servant, whatever his or her own opinion on the matter, must
unambiguously renounce all groups and movements which the competent authorities
hold to be inimical to the Constitution. It does not allow for distinctions between
service and private life ....
For the court, this obligation appeared even more unacceptable since it constituted,
in light of history, a uniquely German characteristic and, furthermore, because the
obligation should be scrutinized with more or less rigor depending on the particular
country. Under these conditions, the right of states to force on their civil servants the
duty of political loyalty risks being akin to setting up a smokescreen. For proof of this,
it is necessary to refer to the ruling upheld some years later in Wille v. Liechtenstein.112
In order to justify his decision not to nominate the President of the Administrative
Court to any future public office, Liechtenstein's head of state invoked the individual's
disregard of his duty of political and constitutional loyalty. This argument was swept
aside by the court, which instead focused its analysis on the punitive and dissuasive
character of the prince's correspondence with the plaintiff.'0 3 The Wille ruling
dramatically confirms that defending the right of political expression of state officials
has led the Strasbourg Court to indirectly protect rights not guaranteed by the
Convention in the matter of the exercise of one's public duties, such as the right of
admission or the right of renewal.
Curiously, the mistrust shown by the court toward the state imposing the obligation
of political and/or constitutional loyalty on civil servants (as long as they do not defend
ideologies of the far right) has not been extended, at least in current European
jurisprudence, to the oaths of constitutional loyalty that are often required of civil
servants and politicians. 14
http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ (click "case-law" then "HUDOC," select "decisions" on the left-
hand column, and search for the application number).
99. 323 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1995).
100. Id. at 28.
101. Id.
102. 1999-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. 279.
103. Id. at 300-04.
104. See, e.g., McGuinness v. United Kingdom, 1999-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 481.
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c. Conditionality of the Duty of Political Confidentiality
The court has expressly recognized states' authority to impose on civil servants a
duty of confidentiality to their employers. 0 5 At first glance, its case law can be
understood as favoring defenses of the duty of confidentiality incumbent upon civil
servants, since the pertinent litigation is generally punctuated by determinations of
nonviolation of Article 10. But in reality, it is fitting to at least distinguish between the
two purposes for the duty of confidentiality: professional and political.
Now, in a similar scenario, the court has justified the duty of political confidentiality
by virtue of considerations connected to the defense or promotion of democracy.
Political impartiality of the administration is considered the guarantor of the proper
functioning of the democratic system. The court endorsed the strict duty of political
neutrality imposed on the United Kingdom relating to various categories of
government officers in the service of local authorities by granting considerable weight
to the legitimacy of the goal sought by litigation regulation, namely safeguarding the
proper functioning of the democratic system of decentralization. In fact, if the
obligation of political neutrality is conceived in the interest of local elected
representatives, it is also and may be above all conceived in the interest of citizens, and
more generally of the public.'0 6 For its part, the court now recognizes the validity of the
obligation of political neutrality and has applied it to members of police forces in
Hungary. 107 According to the court, it is perfectly legitimate for a state committed to
the path of democratic consolidation to adopt as its goal "to depoliticise the [police
service] and thereby to contribute to the consolidation and maintenance of pluralistic
democracy."' 0 8 To the degree that only contracting states that have experienced a
"particular history" can invoke apriori this legitimization, it amounts to saying that the
freedom of speech of police officers is not subject to the same standard of protection in
all the member states of the Council of Europe.
B. Freedom of Expression in the Service of Democratic Control
Convinced of the inadequacies of democratic control exercised by representatives of
the electoral body, and in any event openly hostile to the development of a control of
public powers based on direct democracy methods, the Strasbourg Court has
deliberately favored the media's role as a force of opposition. Journalists and the entire
media generally have been promoted to the rank of vanguard (according to the Marxist
meaning of the term) of democratic control. 19 Thus, the consideration paid to the
fourth estate greatly contributes logically to a lessening of the protection from criticism
afforded to public institutions and their officials. But the promotion of journalistic
expression results above all in an increase in the power of the public's right to
105. De Diego Nafria v. Spain, App. No. 46833/99 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Mar. 14, 2002),
http://www.echr.coe.int/echr (click "case-law" then "HUDOC," select "decisions" on the left-
hand column, and search for the application number).
106. See Ahmed v. United Kingdom, 1998-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 2356.
107. See Rekv~nyi v. Hungary, 1999-IlI Eur. Ct. H.R. 423.
108. Id.
109. See Thorgeirson v. Iceland, 239 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1992).
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information. In the name of the imperative of transparency, European jurisprudence
reduces the reach of government confidentiality (public secrets).
1. The Privileged Protection of Journalistic Expression
Taking into consideration the eminent role held by the press, 110 primarily its
contribution toward open debate within the game of politics, the court has assigned to
the press the role of "watchdog" over democratic society. 111 It is precisely this mission
which explains and justifies the increased level of protection accorded to the freedom
of journalistic expression, which resembles at times a veritable privilege. It is
understandable how such an extremely benevolent attitude adopted by the court with
regard to journalists' freedom of expression could be viewed as placing the media
outside of the law. 12 Within the court, the highly valued protection of journalistic
freedom of expression has never really been challenged as such. On the other hand, the
very degree of this heightened status has been a constant bone of contention.' '3
For a long time, promoting the protection of journalistic expression might have
appeared to have taken on a monopolistic aspect. Now, assuming that such an assertion
was true at a certain time in history, it must of course at present be put into proper
perspective. In fact, the role of "watchdog" over democratic society is no longer the
sole prerogative of the media, 14 but could also be regarded as belonging to bloggers
engaged in amateur journalistic activity." 5 Thus, for the purpose of allowing
journalists "necessary breathing room" (according to the terminology of the U.S.
Supreme Court), 16 the Strasbourg Court has deemed it appropriate not only to ensure
the protection of the confidentiality ofjournalistic sources but also to reduce the reach
ofjournalistic duties.
110. See generally Castells v. Spain, 236 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1992).
111. Thorgeirson, 239 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 27.
112. Jean Morange, La protection de la reputation ou des droits d'autrui et la libertg
d'expression, in 2 LIBERTtS, JUSTICE, TOLtRANCE: MtLANGES EN HOMMAGE AU DoYEN GtRARD
COHEN-JONATHAN, supra note 77, at 1247, 1250-63.
113. For examples of the antagonistic points of view developed by Judges Meyer and Walsh,
see Goodwin v. United Kingdom, 1996-11 Eur. Ct. H.R. 483, 506, 510-11. See also Stoll v.
Switzerland, App. No. 69698/01 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Dec. 10, 2007), http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/
(click "case-law" then "HUDOC," select "decisions" on the left-hand column, and search for the
application number) (Zagrebelsky, J., dissenting).
114. See Vides Aizsardz-tas Klubs v. Latvia, App. No. 57829/00 (Eur. Ct. H.R. May 27,
2004), http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ (click "case-law" then "HUDOC," select "decisions" on the
left-hand column, and search for the application number) (extending the prerogative to
environmental defense groups).
115. DoCQUIR, supra note 7, at 89.
116. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749,771 (1985); see also
N. Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271-72 (1964) (stating that the law must tolerate
occasional erroneous statements if "the freedoms of expression are to have the 'breathing space'
that they 'need... to survive"') (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)).
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i. Protecting the Confidentiality of Journalistic Sources
As the cornerstone of freedom of the press, the protection ofjournalistic sources is
indispensable to performing the role of "watchdog" over democratic society." 7
Consequently, protecting journalistic sources constitutes a "crucial public interest"; any
limits on the confidentiality ofjournalists' sources must undergo the most scrupulous
examination by the Strasbourg Court."i8 The journalist cannot be summoned to divulge
his/her sources of information and does not risk penal (or other) charges for having
revealed information transmitted to him or her that is kept secret by law."l
9
For the court, this system of exorbitant protection guarantees the public's control,
through the intermediary of the press, over the functioning of public institutions,
primarily that of the justice system. In its most recent jurisprudence, the court took
another significant step, at least symbolically, toward promoting the protection of
journalistic sources. It declared that "the right of journalists to not disclose their
sources should not be considered as a simple privilege granted to them depending on
the legality or illegality of their sources, but as an actual attribute of the right to
information .... 1,20
ii. Lessening Journalistic Obligations
The assessment of the "duties and responsibilities" ofjournalists takes into account
the potential impact of the means of communication employed. It is much more
rigorous for television and radio journalists than for their colleagues who work in the
written press.12 However, this difference in treatment does not curtail the overall
117. Goodwin v. United Kingdom, 1996-11 Eur. Ct. H.R. 483,500.
118. Roemen v. Luxembourg, 2003-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 87, 101.
119. Dupuis v. France, App. No. 1914/02 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 7, 2007),
http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ (click "case-law" then "HUDOC," select "decisions" on the left-
hand column, and search for the application number) (discussing a case in which journalists
relied on secret sources to report about government wiretapping of journalists' phones and
stating that "it is necessary to take the greatest care in assessing the need, in a democratic
society, to punish journalists for using information obtained through a breach of the secrecy of
an investigation or a breach of professional confidence when those journalists are contributing
to a public debate of such importance and are thereby playing their role as 'watchdogs' of
democracy"); see also Dammann v. Switzerland, App. No. 7755 1/01 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Apr. 25,
2006), http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ (click "case-law" then "HUDOC," select "decisions" on the
left-hand column, and search for the application number); Ernst v. Belgium, App. No. 33400/96
(Eur. Ct. H.R. July 15, 2003), http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ (click "case-law" then "HUDOC,"
select "decisions" on the left-hand column, and search for the application number); Roemen v.
Luxembourg, 2003-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 87; Fressoz v. France, App. No. 29183/95 (Eur. Ct. H.R.
Jan. 21, 1999), http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ (click "case-law" then "HUDOC," select
"decisions" on the left-hand column, and search for the application number).
120. Tillack v. Belgium, App. No. 20477/05 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Nov. 27, 2007),
http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ (click "case-law" then "HUDOC," select "decisions" on the left-
hand column, and search for the application number).
121. Radio France v. France, 2004-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 119, 152-53 (citing Jersild v. Denmark,
298 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 23 (1994) (stating that "[iln considering the 'duties and
responsibilities' of a journalist, the potential impact of the medium concerned is an important
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tendency of European jurisprudence to reduce journalistic "duties and
responsibilities.' 122 This is particularly evident when journalistic material is about
political actors. The reference to "duties and responsibilities" then becomes purely
rhetorical. 123 However, even beyond this example, the lessening of journalistic
obligations is noticeable whether it concerns the obligation "to provide accurate and
reliable information"'124 or to respect the journalistic code.
a. Lessening the Obligation to Provide Trustworthy Information
The obligation to check the accuracy of published factual statements is far from
systematically enforced. The court seems to accept that information taken from official
sources (official reports or documents, even those not made public) is presumed to be
exact and credible.125 It also exempts the journalist from establishing the accuracy of
information disseminated in cases where the journalist is publishing the various
viewpoints of players in a controversy.126 This reasoning rests on a more general right.
"It is not for this Court... to substitute their own views for those of the press as to
what technique of reporting should be adopted by journalists."' 127 Consequently, the
court refuses to place the burden of the duty of objectivity onjournalists with respect to
information, remarks, and writing that are merely being quoted-as long as the
journalist does not claim the material as his own.12 8 But, this type of authorization is
likely to create a kind of immunity for the journalist that would not be granted if the
remarks reported were ascribable directly back to him or her.129 Since malicious intent
is difficult to prove, using quotations can be employed in some cases for purposes of
concealment.
factor and it is commonly acknowledged that the audiovisual media have often a much more
immediate and powerful effect than the print media ....
122. Id.
123. Yannick Galland, Les obligations desjournalistes dans lajurisprudence de la Cour
europdenne des droits de l'homme, 52 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROITS DE L'HOMME 853, 862
(2000) (Belg.).
124. Radio France, 2004-I1 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 151.
125. See Selisto v. Finland, App. No. 56767/00 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Nov. 16, 2004),
http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ (click "case-law" then "HUDOC," select "decisions" on the left-
hand column, and search for the application number); Bladet Tromso v. Norway, 1999-Ill Eur.
Ct. H.R. 289, 325-27.
126. See Selisto, App. No. 56767/00; Bladet Tromso, 1999-111 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 323-24.
127. Jersild v. Denmark, 298 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 23 (1994); see also Bergens Tidende
v. Norway, 2000-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 371, 403.
128. Cf Pedersen v. Denmark, App. No. 49017/99 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Dec. 17, 2003),
http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ (click "case-law" then "HUDOC," select "decisions" on the left-
hand column, and search for the application number) (holding that, since the journalist-
applicants took a position on the veracity of a source, they had given the impression that the
source was being truthful and did not leave the truth of the source's statements up to the viewer
to decide, thereby incurring liability for libel).
129. See Verlagsgruppe News GmbH v. Austria, App. No. 76918/01 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Dec. 14,
2006), http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ (click "case-law" then "HUDOC," select "decisions" on the
left-hand column, and search for the application number); Thoma v. Luxembourg, 200 1-1I Eur.
Ct. H.R. 67, 88.
20091
INDIANA LA WJOURNAL
b. Lessening the Obligations to Respect the Journalistic Code of Ethics
The court has formally manifested a great respect for the Journalistic Code of Ethics
and Practice. However, the actual consideration of rules governing the practice of
journalism follows a jurisprudential policy that is still in a relatively uncertain and
sometimes even erratic state. It seems that the court leans toward remedial usage of the
journalistic code, that is to say, according it real effect (indeed decisive effect) when
the journalist has demonstrated compliance with rules ratified by professional
charters.130 On the other hand, an obvious disregard for the journalistic code is not
sufficient in and of itself to validate an observance of nonviolation of the
Convention. 31 Moreover, in a seemingly paradoxical manner, the court has had to hide
behind the methodological autonomy of the profession in order to downplay the
obvious disrespect of code rules.'
1 32
The relatively distorted attitude of the court regarding the journalistic code of ethics
can be partially explained. In fact, a rigorous application of the rules governing the
practice ofjournalism would compel the court to review a section of its case law and
most certainly decisions like the Jersildcase.33 But as of late, the court has apparently
been more disposed toward paying greater attention to code rules. It has admitted this
by making reference to the principle of the evolving interpretation of the Convention,
by noting that ensuring respect for the journalistic code of ethics has taken on
heightened importance in today's democratic society.1 34 In addition, for the first time it
seems, the court has been won over by the position of a private journalistic-code-of-
ethics organization to "observe a number of shortcomings in the form of published
articles.1 35 It remains to be seen if the change in the court's attitude will take lasting
hold as minority judges think (and fear) it will.' 36
2. The Right to Criticize Government Officials and Public Institutions
In a democratic system, the acts and omissions of government-whether exercising
an executive or administrative function-must be placed under the attentive watch not
only of legislative and judicial authorities, but also of the press and public opinion.137
For the court, the freedom of speech, notably the element of the right to information,
constitutes a preferred means of exercising this control. However, the extent of the
130. See, e.g., Lopes Gomes da Silva v. Portugal, 2000-X Eur. Ct. H.R. 101.
131. See Cumpgn v. Romania, 2004-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 63, 93.
132. See Bladet Tromso v. Norway, 1999-111 Eur. Ct. H.R. 289, 324-25.
133. See Jersild v. Denmark, App. No. 15890/89 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Sept. 23, 1994),
http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ (click "case-law" then "HUDOC," select "decisions" on the left-
hand column, and search for the application number).
134. Stoll v. Switzerland, App. No. 69698/01 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Dec. 10, 2007),
http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ (click "case-law" then "HUDOC," select "decisions" on the left-
hand column, and search for the application number).
135. Id.
136. See id. (Zagrebelsky, J., dissenting).
137. Castells v. Spain, App. No. 11798/85 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Apr. 23, 1992),
http://www.echr.coe.int/echr (click "case-law" then "HUDOC," select "decisions" on the left-
hand column, and search for the application number).
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right to criticize cannot always conform to one unique standard. European
jurisprudence has had to consider the generally limited capacity of government
officials to reply to criticism. It has also had to take into consideration the working
demands of each public institution under fire.
i. The Right to Criticize Civil Servants
European jurisprudence has consistently reiterated the point that the standard
applicable to the right to criticize political officials is not transferable to attacks against
mere civil servants.13 Nevertheless, it seems more disposed now than in the past
toward allowing criticism of the actions and behaviors of state officials.
At first, the new court gave the impression that it wanted to ensure civil servants a
high degree of protection: "What is more, civil servants must enjoy public confidence
in conditions free of undue perturbation if they are to be successful in performing their
tasks and it may therefore prove necessary to protect them from offensive and abusive
verbal attacks when on duty."'139 At the time, this position could have been considered,
in light of the particular case in question, as severely limiting the freedom of speech of
critics since it did not put into play the principle of reciprocity (the harsh remarks made
by the plaintiff had been in retort to a municipal official's abuse of authority). The
apparent lack of coherence of the right upheld was sharply criticized by one of the
minority judges: "A regime which considers the verbal impertinence of an individual
more reprehensible than illicit excesses by public officers is one that has... pulled the
scale of values inside out.'
140
In its recent case law, however, the Strasbourg Court has given more importance to
protecting the right of freedom of expression. 141 The court clearly aims to adjust the
degree of protection enjoyed by the civil servant in relation to the duties performed; the
higher the level of responsibility, the more the right to criticize must be safeguarded.
Of additional importance, it intends to take into evaluation any professional failings or
wrongdoings attributable to the civil servant. All in all, the court seems to be returning
to finding a balance that it rejected in the Janowski case. In any event, a civil servant's
protection is diminished when the criticism concerns involvement in militant political
activity, even where the criticisms are severe and provocative.
142
138. See, e.g., Pedersen v. Denmark, 2004-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 105, 139; Thoma v.
Luxembourg, 2001-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 67, 84.
139. Janowski v. Poland, App. No. 25716/94 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Jan. 21, 1999),
http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ (click "case-law" then "HUDOC," select "decisions" on the left-
hand column, and search for the application number).
140. Id.
141. See Mam&re v. France, App. No. 12697/03 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Nov. 7, 2006),
http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ (click "case-law" then "HUDOC," select "decisions" on the left-
hand column, and search for the application number).
142. See generally Hrico v. Slovakia, App. No. 49418/99 (Eur. Ct. H.R. July 20, 2004),
http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ (click "case-law" then "HUDOC," select "decisions" on the left-
hand column, and search for the application number) (regarding a judge who appeared on the
Social Christian Party's slate of parliamentary candidates); Perna v. Italy, App. No. 48898/99
(Eur. Ct. H.R July 25,2001), http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ (click "case-law" then "HUDOC,"
select "decisions" on the left-hand column, and search for the application number) (regarding a
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ii. The Right to Criticize the Justice System
The "judiciary power" as outlined by Article 10(2) of the Convention has a broad
scope. It covers "the justice system or the judiciary element of power" but also "judges
acting in their official capacity."' 143 The imperatives of a well-administered justice
system legitimize protection "against destructive attacks that are essentially unfounded,
especially in view of the fact that judges who have been criticised are subject to a duty
of discretion that precludes them from replying."'144 But inversely, a satisfactorily
functioning justice system is hardly conceivable without the attentive watch of public
opinion fully informed by the press.
Initially, reconciling these two requirements within the context of control based on
the existence of the state's restricted discretionary powers seemed relatively chaotic,
indeed incoherent. 45 If recent case law has not eliminated all the risks of contradiction
inherent in the "special case" method, it has nevertheless manifested a structural
tendency toward reinforcing the protection of the freedom of speech. This tendency
can be illustrated by jurisprudential developments relative to a lawyer's right to
criticize even though they require first determining if the critical remarks were made
inside or outside of the courtroom.
In the first scenario, inside the courtroom, the freedom of expression enjoyed by a
lawyer, while not limitless, is quite extensive as long as it does not take the form of
offensive or abusive remarks. In fact, harsh criticism of the prosecution can be used
strategically by a lawyer but is not considered justification for a civil conviction, or
even a low fine. In casu, the court is careful to specify that the freedom of expression
exercised against a prosecutor is broader than that directed against ajudge.146 But, this
reservation did not prevent the court from confirming its attachment to the lawyer's full
right to freedom of expression in the courtroom despite the fact that the criticism
applied to the court or at least to some of its members. 14
7
The freedom of expression enjoyed by a lawyer outside of the courtroom is
definitely subject to less protection, but may be in the process of being strengthened.
Certainly, the court would like to avoid the situation whereby lawyers use their right to
freedom of expression as a procedural strategy inside the court. 148 In any case, the most
judge known for his membership in the Italian Communist Party).
143. Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, App. No. 6538/74 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Apr. 26, 1979),
http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ (click "case-law" then "HUDOC," select "decisions" on the left-
hand column, and search for the application number).
144. Prager v. Austria, App. No. 15974/90 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Apr. 26, 1995),
http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ (click "case-law" then "HIUDOC," select "decisions" on the left-
hand column, and search for the application number).
145. See Wachsmann, supra note 24, at 1027.
146. Nikula v. Finland, 2002-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 291, 310-11.
147. Kyprianou v. Cyprus, App. No. 73797/01 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Dec. 15, 2005),
http://www.echr/coe.int/echr/ (click "case-law" then "HUDOC," select "decisions" on the left-
hand column, and search for the application number). In the Kyprianou case, the discourteous
comments made by the lawyer were solely about the manner in which the judges were leading
the criminal hearing. Id. Moreover, the court convicted the lawyer of contempt of court and
sentenced the lawyer to prison without the guarantees of a fair trial. Id.
148. See Sch6pfer v. Switzerland, 1998-Ill Eur. Ct. H.R. 1042, 1053. In Sch6pfer, the lawyer
called a press meeting to criticize the handling of a case in which he was involved and, more
generally, to vehemently denounce the way in which the cantonal justice system functioned. Id
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recent case law shows a slight shift in the court's position. In fact, it allows for a lawyer
actively involved in a criminal case to acquire, through the intermediary of the media,
information relative to the case and even to criticize the action of the public
prosecutor.1
49
In addition, the court has sought to guarantee lawyers, in the absence of
involvement in the case, a right to freely criticize decisions made by the court,
particularly where the main reason for suppressing criticism is to satisfy the judges'
egos. 150
iii. The Right to Criticize the Military
Although nonviolent displays of hostility toward the military and armed forces must
be tolerated in a democratic society, the court nevertheless has ruled that the temporary
police detention of two pacifist demonstrators who slightly disturbed an important
military ceremony did not contradict Article 10.15' This decision must not lead to
confusion, however. It does not deliberately attempt to curb the free expression of
pacifist opinions, but is rather an overall choice in jurisprudential policy, in this case,
the display of less sensitivity toward freedom of speech due to other considerations
coming into play, such as the maintenance of public order.15 2 Any other reading of this
jurisprudence would make one think that the court might follow a relatively
paradoxical line of conduct since, for more than a decade, it has adopted a rather
protective attitude toward the freedom of speech. The court's attitude, vis- -vis military
officers critical of the army, speaks volumes about the duty of political confidentiality
to which the officers could be subjected.
According less weight than it previously had to respect for military discipline,' 53 the
Strasbourg Court went on to partially liberate the political expression of military
officers, primarily that of draftees.154 It considered that freedom of the press must also
be allowed to reside within the barracks as long as it was devoid of blatant antimilitary
designs or those of revolutionary unrest.155 As a consequence, the military authorities'
power over internal matters does not apply to critical publications, even satirical
149. See Foglia v. Switzerland, App. No. 35865/04 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Dec. 13, 2007),
http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ (click "case-law" then "HUDOC," select "decisions" on the left-
hand column, and search for the application number). Because of its benign character, calling
into question the public prosecutor's office was not deemed likely to undermine the public's
confidence in the justice system. Id. As for the divulging of information, according to the court,
it can be viewed as fulfilling the public's right to receive information regarding activities carried
out by judicial authorities. Id.
150. Amihalachioaie v. Moldova, 2004-111 Eur. Ct. H.R. 197, 207-08.
151. Chorherr v. Austria, App. No. 13308/87 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Aug. 25, 2003),
http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ (click "case-law" then "HUDOC," select "decisions" on the left-
hand column, and search for the application number).
152. See Steel v. United Kingdom, 1998-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. 2719, 2743.
153. See Engel v. Netherlands, App. No. 5100/71 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 8, 1976),
http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ (click "case-law" then "HUDOC," select "decisions" on the left-
hand column, and search for the application number).





publications making demands or launching reform proposals. 5 6 This is because they
do not call into question the duty of obedience, or the military establishment as a
whole. The reinsertion of freedom of expression and of the press into the barracks goes
even further. In fact, the court made states responsible for circulating an informational
magazine critiquing the functioning of the military, provided that comparable
magazines (uncritical or hardly critical) also benefit from official circulation.' 57
Taken literally, the court's jurisprudence gives the impression of guaranteeing a
right to "collective insult" within the context of "symbolic speech" in accordance with
the meaning attributed to these words by the United States Supreme Court. 158 Reading
the dissenting opinions expressed by the minority judges in Grigoriades v. Greece,159
the court sacrificed military discipline for the benefit of an aggravating interpretation
of the freedom of expression. Such a conclusion is not totally without basis but it seems
it is too radical. In Grigoriades, the violation of Article 10 was based on the almost
confidential nature of a letter of criticism (which was, in reality, an antimilitaristic
diatribe using particularly violent terms) written by the plaintiff. The plaintiff had been
drafted by the army, but held the rank of sub-Lieutenant.160 Thus, there was an absence
of real impact that the letter might have had on military discipline. In contrast,
infringement of freedom of speech would not have been established if the remarks
directed against the army had managed to reach a larger audience. In casu, the letter
had been addressed only to the unit commander and to a petty officer. Since the
dissenting opinions dwell on an extremely disruptive and illogical interpretation of the
Convention's orientation, the court would have prepared a bed of anarchy and
antidemocratic subversion inside the army.
3. Increasing Protection in Cases of Divulging "Public Secrets"
"Press freedom assumes even greater importance in circumstances in which State
activities and decisions escape democratic or judicial scrutiny on account of their
confidential or secret nature."' 61 In support of this statement, the Strasbourg Court
consulted the soft law of the Council of Europe, in this case Resolution 1551/2007,
regarding the fairness of legal proceedings in cases of espionage or divulgence of
government secrets. 162 The court quoted the position of the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights when evaluating these cases: "The disclosure of State-
held information should play a very important role in a democratic society, because it
enables civil society to control the actions of the Government to which it has entrusted
the protection of its interests."' 63 Although the court has not systematically sacrificed
committed interests in protecting government secrets to strengthening extreme freedom
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).
159. 1997-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. 2575, 2597-98 (Freeland, J., dissenting).
160. See id. at 2580-82.
161. Stoll v. Switzerland, App. No. 69698/01 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Dec. 10, 2007),
http:/www.echr.coe.int/echr/ (click "case-law" then "HUDOC," select "decisions" on the left-
hand column, and search for the application number).
162. Id.
163. Claude-Reyes v. Chile, 2006 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 151 (Sept. 19, 2006).
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of expression, it undeniably has followed a policy of eroding "public secrets" with the
enhanced promotion of, and regard for, the public's right to information.
i. Judiciary Secrets
Recently, European litigation challenging the protection of the confidentiality of
judicial proceedings has, for the most part, originated in France. The Strasbourg
Court's condemnation of the ban on publishing information from penal proceedings
arose in a civil lawsuit. The claim was motivated by the ban's absolute and general
nature and, as a result, by its nondiscriminatory character since such a ban does not
apply to penal proceedings initiated following a public prosecutor's requisitioning or
by simple complaint. 164 In this instance, the argument made to protect implicated
individuals is relegated to the background in light of the sufficient protection assured
by other mechanisms of French law. Even more fundamental is the fact that the
existence of public control over the proceedings in question is considered as adding to
the ban's effectiveness.
The issue of unconventionality raised against the ban on the use and reproduction of
elements in a case file, and consequently against the ban on infringing court secrecy,'
65
is also in response to the recurring preoccupation of the court with satisfying the
public's right to information about the proper functioning of the penal justice system.
This concern is held not only by the court, but is shared by the Committee of Ministers
of the Council of Europe in its recommendation "on the provision of information
through the media in relation to criminal proceedings."' 66 This recommendation, to
which the court refers, addresses the dissemination of information by the media related
to penal proceedings. For these two institutions, the only legitimate reason for
confidentiality is the protection of the presumption of innocence of the suspect or
accused individual. The fact remains that the court's decision in Tourancheau v.
France to uphold a criminal law banning the publication of official court proceedings
and the listing of charges at public hearings1 67 is based on a strict protection of the
presumption of innocence and runs counter to the previously mentioned
jurisprudence. 68
At first glance, Tourancheau disputes the validity of case law relating to the
protection of journalistic sources, since it states no opposition to a journalist
mentioning the contents of said indictment papers and court documents without citing
his/her sources. In summary, the case (decided by a one-vote majority) provides an
164. See Du Roy v. France, 2000-X Eur. Ct. H.R. 205,215.
165. See Dupuis v. France, App. No. 1914/02 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 7, 2006),
http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ (click "case-law" then "HUDOC," select "decisions" on the left-
hand column, and search for the application number).
166. COMM. OF MINISTERS, COUNCIL OF EuR., RECOMMENDATION No. R (2003) 13 OF THE
COMMITrEE OF MINISTERS TO MEMBER STATES ON THE PROvIsION OF INFORMATION THROUGH THE
MEDIA IN RELATION TO CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS (2003), available at
http://www.cra.ba/en/broadcast/reports/default.aspx?cid=2673.
167. Tourancheau v. France, App. No. 53886/00 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Nov. 24, 2005),
http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ (click "case-law" then "HUDOC," select "decisions" on the left-
hand column, and search for the application number).
168. See Du Roy, 2000-X Eur. Ct. H.R. at 222 (Costa, J., dissenting).
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additional example, in detail, of the extremely limited coherence of European
jurisprudence in the domain of freedom of expression.
ii. National Security Secrets
Before the fall of the Berlin Wall, the European Commission of Human Rights
favored the protection of military secrets even if the breach was attributable to a
civilian.169 The Strasbourg Court, in turn, treated the disclosure of defense secrets by
career military officers with comparable severity. In fact, while considering
information classified as military secrets to be protected by Article 10 of the
Convention, the court refused to grant military personnel the right to divulge said
information on the grounds that the information never was secret or was no longer a
secret. 70 But the court's increased safeguarding of the freedom of expression will
weaken the protection of national security secrets. The court will rule that the
publication or dissemination of information covered by military confidentiality
rendered the latter unenforceable. Noting that confidential information, once
disseminated (even if illegally), is by definition no longer a secret, the court has given
preference to the freedom of speech of the disseminating individuals over the state
interest in secrecy. It ruled accordingly about an English court's ban on publication
even though the information, the work of a former secret service agent, had already
reached bookshelves in the United States. 17 1 The same decision prevailed, in a similar
context, to measures enacted to confiscate and withdraw from circulation a periodical
publishing a study of the Netherlands' internal secret service.'
72
iii. Diplomatic Confidentiality
The position, adopted recently by the court, protecting the confidentiality of
diplomatic documents 173 will be primarily viewed, without a doubt, as diminishing both
journalists' freedom of expression and the public's right to information. In fact, it
appears that the Grand Chamber adopts a stance completely opposite of the chamber's
in order to determine the nonviolation of Article 10.174 Contrary to the chamber, the
Grand Chamber lends decisive importance to two considerations. First, the negative
repercussions that it believes arise from publishing confidential information concerning
the government's handling of foreign policy. Second, the sensational form of the
169. See Jean-Frangois Flauss, L 'incidence du droit europien sur l'exercice de la libert4
d'expression desfonctionnaires en uniforme, in LA LmERTt D'ExPRESSION DES FONCTIONNAIRES
EN UNIFORME 55, 62 n.3 (Roseline Letteron ed., 2000).
170. See Hadjianastassiou vs. Greece, 252 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 18-19 (1992).
171. See Observer & Guardian v. United Kingdom, 216 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 33-35
(1991).
172. See Verenigung Weekblad Bluff v. Netherlands, 306 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at3 (1995).
173. See Stoll v. Switzerland, App. No. 69698/01 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Dec. 10, 2007),
http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ (click "case-law" then "HUDOC," select "decisions" on the left-
hand column, and search for the application number).
174. See Stoll v. Switzerland, App. No. 69698/01 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Apr. 25, 2006),
http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ (click "case-law" then "HUDOC," select "decisions" on the left-
hand column, and search for the application number).
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publication of this confidential information. On the other hand, both the chamber and
Grand Chamber agree about the applicable principles. They agree, for the most part,
that while the confidentiality of diplomatic reports is justified, a priori, it is not to be
protected at any price. In addition, both express the view that the media's role of
criticism and control applies to the sphere of foreign policy. In other words, in the
name of Article 10, the court reserves the right to monitor the exercise of diplomatic
duties.
II. THE DEMANDS OF DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY AND THE CHANNELING OF FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION
Democratic society is tolerant but not inert. As a militant democracy, society must
defend its basic principles. Consequently, it also has the duty to fight against abuses,
committed in the exercise of freedom of speech, that openly target democratic values.
If freedom of expression occupies a primordial place within the body of rights and
freedoms guaranteed by the Convention, it still must simultaneously coexist with other
concurrent, and at times conflicting, rights and freedoms.
A. Prohibited Speech and Language in Light of the Values of Democratic Society
A refusal to grant the protection afforded by Article 10 of the Convention can be
based on an appeal to Article 17.175 In practice, the pure and simple forfeiture of
freedom of expression is rarely imposed by the Strasbourg Court. 176 European judges
prefer using the scale rather than the sword of justice. That is to say, the court is
inclined to read the restriction clause of Article 10(2) through the lens of Article 17,
thereby enabling it to refuse the protection of contentious language without making use
of the "guillotine" provision. The principle itself of "condemnation" of language
contrary to the values of the Convention is fully accepted. On the other hand, its
application in casu is not the most rigorous. The court has demonstrated a relatively
understanding attitude toward outright adversaries of democratic society.
1. Revisionist Language
In extension of the European Commission's human rights jurisprudence, 177 the
Strasbourg Court decided upon the existence of a category of clearly established
historical events whose denial or revision does not, by virtue of Article 17, come under
the protection of Article 10.178 To this end, the following indelible "notorious historical
175. See supra note 68.
176. See S6bastian Van Drooghenbroeck, L "article 17 de la Convention europ~enne des
droits de l'homme est-il indispensable?, 46 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME 541,
542 (2001) (Beig.).
177. Patrick Wachsmann, Lajurisprudence recente de la Commission europdenne des droits
de l'homme: de n~gationnisme, in LA CoNvENTIoN EUROPEENNE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME:
DtVELOPPEMENTS RECENTS ET NOUVEAUX DIFIS 103 (Jean-Frangois Flauss & M. de Salvia eds.,
1997).
178. See, e.g., Chauvy v. France, 2004-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 205, 229 (noting, in an aside, that
the Holocaust belongs "to the category of clearly established historical facts"); Garaudy v.
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truths" have been enumerated thus far: the Holocaust, Nazi persecution of Jews, the
Nuremburg trials, and crimes against humanity committed during World War II. The
inability to dispute these "notorious historical truths" is as much a matter of their
reality as it is of their magnitude and gravity. In order to justify the application of
Article 17, vis-&-vis revisionist language, the court does not lean solely upon the denial
of a "notorious historical truth," but also points simultaneously to the disregard shown
toward fundamental values of the Convention. "The denial or rewriting of this type of
historical fact undermines the values on which the fight against racism and anti-
Semitism are based and constitutes a serious threat to public order. 1 79 However, it is
also true that the court sometimes makes reference to abuses of the freedom of speech
that are incompatible with democracy and human rights.180 The use of the forfeiture
clause is indicative, for all intents and purposes, of a hardening of policy.181 In other
words, it likely removes any doubt about the existence of the court's possible
complacency with respect to revisionism by omission.182
2. Language of Intolerance or Hate Speech
European jurisprudence very clearly "condemns" any form of hate speech in
principle. In Jersild v. Denmark, the Strasbourg Court affirTmed that "Article 10...
should not be interpreted in such a way as to limit, derogate from or destroy the right to
protection against racial discrimination under the UN Convention."' 83 More recently,
the court has explained that "remarks aimed at inciting racial hatred in society or
propagating the idea of a superior race can not claim any protection under Article 10 of
the Convention"; I14 that "expressions that seek to spread, incite or justify hatred based
on intolerance, including religious intolerance, do not enjoy the protection afforded by
Article 10"; 185 and finally that the protection granted by Article 10 does not apply to
"concrete words constituting hate speech that might be offensive to individuals or
groups."'
186
France, 2003-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 369 (stating that, under Article 17, historical descriptions that
negative the Holocaust are not protected by Article 10); Lehideux v. France, 1998-VII Eur. Ct.
H.R. 2864, 2879 (describing the applicants' text as "present[ing] certain historical facts in a
manifestly erroneous manner").
179. Garaudy, 2003-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. at 397.
180. See Witzsch v. Germany, App. No. 7485/03 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Dec. 13, 2005),
http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ (click "case-law" then "HUDOC," select "decisions" on the left-
hand column, and search for the application number).
181. See Michel Levinet, La fermetg bienvenue de la Cour europdenne des droits de
I'hommeface au ndgationnisme, 59 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DES DRorrS DE L'HOMME 653 (2004)
(Belg.).
182. See, e.g., Lehideux, 1998-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. at 2864.
183. Jersild v. Denmark, 298 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 20 (1995).
184. Aksoy v. Turkey, App. No. 28635/95 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 10, 2000),
http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ (click "case-law" then "HUDOC," select "decisions" on the left-
hand column, and search for the application number).
185. Gtlndtlz v. Turkey, 2003-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 257, 275.
186. Erbakan v. Turkey, App. No. 59405/00 (Eur. Ct. H.R. July 6, 2006),
http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ (click "case-law" then "HUDOC," select "decisions" on the left-
hand column, and search for the application number).
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The court tends to maintain a syncretic and extensive view of hate speech. Hate
speech is not limited solely to the domain of racial or religious discrimination. It was
defined in 1997 by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe. According to
that definition, hate speech encompasses "all forms of expression which spread, incite,
promote or justify racial hatred, xenophobia, anti-Semitism or other forms of hatred
based on intolerance, including: intolerance expressed by aggressive nationalism and
ethnocentrism, discrimination, and hostility against minorities, migrants, and people of
immigrant origin." 8 7 In other words, banning hate speech as thus outlined is a breeding
ground for the proliferation of crimes of opinion, or at least leads to an exacerbation of
political correctness. In particular, it is lamentable that the Committee of Ministers,
using its own unique logic, showed restraint by neglecting to explicitly envisage
manifestations of intolerance committed on the part of minorities against the majority
of the population.
Statistically, up until the present, the forfeiture of protection afforded by Article 10
has been declared only rarely in cases where comments have fallen within the
definition of hate speech.188 Under such circumstances, the decisions made by the court
in this context merit all the more attention. For example, a British citizen's display of a
poster in his house window with the following text: "Islam out of Britain-Protect the
British People" and accompanied by a photo of the World Trade Center in flames, 89
qualified as religious hate speech. 9° According to the court, the words and images
appearing on the poster constituted an attack against all Muslims in the United
Kingdom. Because of its generality and vehemence, such an attack against a religious
group is incompatible with the values proclaimed and protected by the Convention-
namely, tolerance, social peace, and nondiscrimination. The same reasoning was used
toward fundamentally anti-Semitic speech, akin to hate speech directed against an
ethnic group.1 9'
The refusal to protect hate speech is generally based on an application of the
restriction clause of Article 10(2), read expressly or impliedly through the lens of
Article 17.192 However, the Strasbourg Court's aversion to hate speech does not stop it,
187. COMM. OF MINISTERS, COUNCIL OF EUR., RECOMMENDATION No. R (1997) 20 OF THE
COMMITrEE OF MINISTERS TO MEMBER STATES ON "HATE SPEECH" (1997), available at
http://www.coe.az/pfddoc/committee of ministers/Rec%20No.%20R%20(97)%2020%20(e).pdf.
188. For an inventory of pertinent cases, see LA LIBERTE D'EXPRESSION EN EUROPE:
JURISPRUDENCE RELATIVE A L'ARTICLE 10 DE LA CONVENTION EUROPEENNE DE DROITs DE
L'HOMME (Conseil de l'Europe ed., 3d ed. 2006).
189. Norwood v. United Kingdom, 2004-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 343, 347.
190. Id. at 349.
191. See Ivanov v. Russia, App. No. 35222/04 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 20, 2007),
http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ (click "case-law" then "HUDOC," select "decisions" on the left-
hand column, and search for the application number).
192. See Garaudy v. France, 2003-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 375; see also Karatepe v. Turkey, App.
No. 41551/98 (Eur. Ct. H.R. July 31, 2007), http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ (click "case-law"
then "HUDOC," select "decisions" on the left-hand column, and search for the application
number) (dealing with religious hate speech); Seurot v. France, App. No. 57383/00 (Eur. Ct.
H.R. May 18, 2004), http://www.echr.coe.intlechr/ (click "case-law" then "HUDOC," select
"decisions" on the left-hand column, and search for the application number) (dealing with hate




depending on the context, from allowing Article 10 to come into play and, even in
some cases, from finding a violation of the provision. 93 It happened thus in three well-
known cases whose doctrine has been widely debated.
In Jersild v. Denmark,194 notwithstanding the obviously heinous character of
remarks made on the topic of the ban against racial discrimination (among other things,
comments were made comparing the physical traits of people of African origin with
those of the great primates living on the same continent), the court gave priority to the
defense of the freedom of expression with the justification that the words were not
actually said by the plaintiff, a journalist condemned for having allowed their
dissemination in a televised report.
In Giindiiz v. Turkey, 195 contentious remarks stigmatizing and calumniating people
born of parents not married according to a specific religious tradition (to be precise,
not married according to the law of the Koran), though religious hate speech, were
excused by the court when they were said live by a religious dignitary during a
televised program.
In Erbakan v. Turkey,196 the speech in question demonstrated religious intolerance
by calling upon voters to identify themselves based upon the criteria of religious
affiliation. The speech called for the rejection of nonbelievers, that is to say non-
Muslims and nonpracticing Muslims, in a society where the principle of a secular state
prevailed constitutionally. Taking into consideration the reduced impact of this
electoral speech and the long delay before the government acted, the court downplayed
its significance. The importance thus given to the context can be decisive, perhaps even
more so in litigation involving language of violence.
3. Language of Violence
Incitement to violence, insurrection, or armed resistance cannot be tolerated in a
democratic society. The situation whereby it is inserted into the context of political
struggle for the purpose of defending the rights of a national minority has no absolving
value. 97 Thus, any kind of speech or language supporting the possibility of the use of
force for secessionist ends will be considered language inviting violence. 98 Recently,
the court had the opportunity to explicitly state what it meant by incitement to violence.
It clarified the matter by defining incitement as not only a direct call to violence but
193. See Mario Oetheimer, La Cour europdenne des droits de l'homme face au discours de
haine, 69 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DES DRorrS DE L'HOMME 63, 74-75 (2007) (Belg.).
194. 298 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1994).
195. 2003-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 257.
196. App. No. 59405/00 (Eur. Ct. H.R. July 6, 2006), http://www.echr.coe.intlechr/ (click
"case-law" then "HUDOC," select "decisions" on the left-hand column, and search for the
application number).
197. See Zana v. Turkey, 1997-VII Er. Ct. H.R. 2533, 2548-49.
198. But see Yazar v. Turkey, App. No. 42713/98 (Er. Ct. H.R. Sept. 23, 2004),
http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ (click "case-law" then "HUDOC," select "decisions" on the left-
hand column, and search for the application number) (holding that, because the speech was
determined to not have as its aim inciting violence or armed resistance, the state had not violated
Article 10 of the Convention).
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also occurring through more indirect and diffuse means.199 For example, remarks that
have the potential to awaken animal instincts and strengthen deeply entrenched
prejudices resulting in deadly violence can be considered inciting violence. In fact, in
"this context, the reader can get the impression that recourse to violence is a necessary
and justifiable measure of self-defense in the face of an aggressor." 2°°
The identification of remarks as those inciting violence does not lead the court to
ipsofacto restrict the freedom of expression of the authors of such statements. It simply
confers more extensive discretionary powers to national authorities in order to
implement limitations on the exercise of freedom of speech.20 1 The court was (and
seems again) divided on the proper way to assess the existence of an incitement to
violence. The disagreement principally revolves around the role that context should
play in the matter. Some judges are of the opinion that too much emphasis is placed on
context already. They would rather give priority to the content itself of the contentious
text.20 2 Other judges, who favor increased protection of freedom of expression, are
anxious to accord more weight to the context than to the text 20 3 and propose attaching
decisive importance to the actuality or imminence of a risk of violence. 204 The
prominence given to context is nevertheless likely to produce the opposite effect.20 5
The fact remains that the suppression of incitement to violence is particularly
monitored by the court whenever the publication or message in question takes the form
of a work of art, even if it enjoys only limited distribution. 206 In such a scenario, the
court is led to empty the language of its venom or, at the very least, to weaken its
tone.20 7 When the incitement to violence is not disseminated by its author, the third
199. Dogan v. Turkey (No. 3), App. No. 4119/02 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 10, 2006),
http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ (click "case-law" then "HUDOC," select "decisions" on the left-
hand column, and search for the application number).
200. Id.
201. See Stirek v. Turkey (No. 1), 1999-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 353, 382 (requiring that the
reasoning for interference be "relevant and sufficient").
202. For an example of this argument, see Karatas v. Turkey, 1999-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 81,
120-21 (Wildhaber, J., dissenting).
203. See e.g., SUrek v. Turkey (No. 4), App. No. 24762/94 (Eur. Ct. H.R. July 8, 1999),
http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ (click "case-law" then "HUDOC," select "decisions" on the left-
hand column, and search for the application number) (Palm, Tulkens, Fischbach, Casadevall &
Greve, JJ., concurring).
204. See id.
205. See Hogefeld v. Germany, App. No. 35402/97 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Jan. 20, 2000),
http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ (click "case-law" then "HUDOC," select "decisions" on the left-
hand column, and search for the application number) (declaring the application inadmissible
after considering the applicant's background in evaluating the statements at issue).
206. See Alinak v. Turkey, App. No. 40287/98 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Mar. 29, 2005),
http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ (click "case-law" then "HIDOC," select "decisions" on the left-
hand column, and search for the application number) (finding a violation when the work was a
novel with limited mass appeal).
207. But see Kuiqitk v. Turkey, App. No. 28493/95 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Dec. 5, 2002),
http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ (click "case-law" then "HUDOC," select "decisions" on the left-
hand column, and search for the application number) (deciding the government's interference
was not in proportion to its legitimate objective); Karatas, 1999-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. at 109-10
(finding a violation where the work was artistic in nature and had a small audience).
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parties who serve as messengers are bound by the duty of objectivity with respect to
comments reported. In any case, this was the position taken most recently by the court
regarding the publication by an organ of the press of statements signed by detainees
claiming to be members of a terrorist group and calling for the demolition of prisons
through violent action. 20 8 In Falakaolu v. Turkey, those responsible for publishing the
statements were not connected in any way personally, but by the same token, they did
not distance themselves enough from the statements either.209 Now, according to the
court's decision, the right to communicate information cannot be used as an alibi or
pretext to disseminate statements from terrorist groups.
B. Enforceable Individual Rights to Freedom of Expression
In the absence of a clause resolving the conflict between rights established by the
text of the Convention itself, European judges may be tempted to resort to the
preemptive elimination of the conflict by using the technique of disqualification-the
infringement caused by the freedom of speech is placed outside the field of the targeted
concurrent right. In the opposite scenario, where the conflict is crystallized, the court
will usually choose to weigh the freedom of expression against the concurrent or
competing right. In some exceptions, the court will opt to use its right to organize the
rights in a hierarchical order. In conclusion, the freedom of expression,
notwithstanding its status as a highly valued freedom, is far from systematically
receiving preferential protection.
1. Concurrent Rights Enjoying Strengthened Enforceability
i. The Right of Ownership
Confrontations between the right of freedom of expression and the right of
ownership make use of the court's option to organize rights into a hierarchical order.
Without resorting to the technique of weighing respective interests against each other
in an attempt to protect both rights, the Strasbourg Court clearly gives precedence to
the second over the first.210 In this case, it deems that the state is not obliged to take
measures to counteract the action of the owner of a private commercial center who had
prohibited access to environmentalists wanting to gather signatures at the center's
entrance and aisles in support of a petition against the construction of a sports complex
in the vicinity. The court considered that the restriction limiting freedom of expression
was limited to a specific geographic area. In particular, the restriction did not apply to
the premises of merchants or service providers installed inside the commercial center.
In support of the defense of their freedom of expression, the plaintiffs invoked, in a
very substantial manner, pertinent American and Canadian case law. This
jurisprudence, favorable to recognizing the notion of "private spaces almost public in
208. See Falakaoglu v. Turkey, App. No. 22147/02 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Jan. 31, 2007),
http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ (click "case-law" then "HUDOC," select "decisions" on the left-
hand column, and search for the application number).
209. Id.
210. See Appleby v. United Kingdom, 2003-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 185.
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nature," is reproduced in the "In fact" section of the Strasbourg's Court's ruling.2 n
Although the court takes this case law into consideration, it deems nevertheless, using
an almost commonplace or trivial methodology, that the jurisprudence invoked was not
sufficiently well-established. Above all, it highlights the fact that the Unites States
Supreme Court refrained from upholding, at the federal level, the existence of a right to
free expression within private commercial malls.212 Does that mean that in the opposite
case, the Strasbourg Court would have admitted the presence of a "sufficiently
emerging consensus" favoring the manner claimed by the plaintiffs for exercising their
freedom of expression and that, consequently, it would not have dismissed a reading of
Article 10 of the Convention on Human Rights in light of United States federal law?
ii. Protection of Religious Convictions
In order to "condemn" offensive speech or language ridiculing others' religious
convictions (or language considered as such), the Strasbourg Court bases its decisions
on the "protection of rights of others" 213 and, more specifically, on defending the actual
guarantee of diversity of opinions and beliefs. Indeed, in extreme cases, it resorts to
specific methods to deny or oppose religious beliefs that can end up dissuading
believers from openly expressing their beliefs and exercising their right to freedom of
religion.214 Now, if this justification is undeniably valid for religious convictions held
by the minority, it is treated with caution when the religious sentiments at stake are
held by the majority and with still more caution when held by the ultra majority.
The importance given to the defense of religious convictions has also been
criticized on the ground that the court tended, more or less admittedly, to inscribe
morality into the "protection of the rights of others." 215 In order to distinguish between
lawful and unlawful antireligious speech with regard to the Convention, the court relies
on two determinations. First of all, it deems that protecting the rights of others creates
for the speaker "an obligation to avoid as far as possible expressions that are
gratuitously offensive to others and thus an infringement on their rights, and which
therefore do not contribute to any form of public debate capable of furthering progress
in human affairs." 216 It further specifies that the propagation of doctrines antagonistic
to the faith of believers must be tolerated, except in cases where injurious attacks are
made against sacred symbols or objects of religious veneration.2 17 This distinguishing
211. See id. at 194-96.
212. See Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
213. Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria, 295 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 6, 12, 19 (1994).
214. See id. at 19.
215. Patrick Wachsmann, La religion contre la liberti d expression:sur un arr~t regrettable
de la Cour europeenne des droits de l'homme, 6 REVUE UNIVERSELLE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME
441 (1994).
216. See, e.g., Giniewski v. France, App. No. 64016/00 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Jan. 31, 2006),
http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ (click "case-law" then "HUDOC," select "decisions" on the left-
hand column, and search for the application number).
217. See Tatlav v. Turkey, App. No. 50692/99 (Eur. Ct. H.R. May 2, 2006),
http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ (click "case-law" then "HUDOC," select "decisions" on the left-




criterion is not totally convincing to the extent that it is without doubt not actually
operative for religions that dogmatically or intellectually are unfamiliar with, or refuse
to recognize, the dissociation ruling upheld by the court. But, perhaps, it is at least as
convincing, if not more so, than proposals attempting to limit the protection of other
people's religious sentiments to only serious 218 insults or those going beyond a
"reasonable limit."2 19
In view of the apparent priority given the protection of religious convictions over
freedom of expression, European jurisprudence has managed to worry those in favor of
a secular democratic society.220 The same type of concern could also be fed by the
difference in treatment upheld by the court with respect to antireligious and antisecular
speech; the first gets less protection than the second. In short, the duty of believers and
nonbelievers to display tolerance is asymmetrical. In actuality, there is not reciprocity
in the matter. Moreover, unlike the protection of religious sentiments that is assured
alternatively or conjointly on the basis of Articles 9(1) and 10(2) of the Convention,
the protection of nonreligious convictions (atheists, agnostics, or other) is only possible
by virtue of Article 10(2). In addition, the court gives the impression of showing
benevolence with respect to remarks aimed at discrediting nonbelievers as long as the
antisecular language does not fall within the category of hate speech based on religious
intolerance.22 1 In other words, if secular defamation is widely allowed by the court in a
constitutionally secular country, it should, logically speaking, be even more so in a
state that does not have this characteristic, namely-within all the member states
except France.
The attention paid by the court to protecting minority religious beliefs also reveals a
difference in treatment. Specifically, a duty of precaution was imposed on
"antisectarian" movements when descending into the arena of public debate. Said
movements "must show a greater degree of tolerance vis-i-vis criticisms formulated by
opponents regarding their objectives and methods employed in the debate. 222 A
similar obligation has not been, up until the present anyway, imposed on "sectarian
movements," and even more generally, on minority religious groups. It is apparently
only in the case of political debate that this duty of precaution weakens.223 Would the
218. See, e.g., Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria, 295 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 3,24(1994)
(Palm, Pekkanen & Makarczyk, JJ., dissenting).
219. Wingrove v. United Kingdom, 1996-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 1937, 1966 (Lohmus, J.,
dissenting).
220. See LA., 2005-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. at 260-61 (Costa, Cabral Barreto & Jungwiert, JJ.,
dissenting).
221. See Nur Radyo Ve Televizyon Yaymciligi A.5. v. Turkey, App. No. 6587/03 (Eur. Ct.
H.R. Nov. 27, 2007), http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ (click "case-law" then "HUDOC," select
"decisions" on the left-hand column, and search for the application number) (commenting that
the court is to measure remarks by whether they encourage violence or hatred against
nonbelievers); Gtindiiz v. Turkey, 2003-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 257, 275 (finding that defending a
religious view without calling for violence to establish it is not hate speech).
222. Paturel v. France, App. No. 54968/00 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Dec. 22, 2005),
http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ (click "case-law" then "HUDOC," select "decisions" on the left-
hand column, and search for the application number).
223. See Jerusalem v. Austria, 2001-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 69. In Jerusalem, the antisectarian
language was declared to be within the fr-amework of a political assembly by a person having an
elective mandate. Moreover, the "psycho-sect" specifically challenged by name had ties with a
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difference in treatment (even if minor) established between antireligious and
antisecular speech combine with a difference in treatment within antireligious speech
or language in accordance with the religious convictions at stake? In other words,
would there be some religions better protected or more worthy of protection than
others? At first glance, the question seems wacky or maybe even tactless. However, the
fact remains that this question would be perfectly relevant if the court did not have to
apply the Giniewski224 standard identically to all religious faiths without distinction,
and not only to those which practice repentance.
2. Concurrent Rights Enjoying Only Limited Enforceability
i. The Right to One's Reputation
There is no provision in the Convention that expressly guarantees a right to one's
reputation. This explains why it has been treated as a component of "protecting the
rights of others" and, as such, has been legitimately restricted. A detailed study of the
jurisprudence of both the former and new court would highlight the preference given to
freedom of expression in cases where it conflicts with the preservation of the reputation
of others. The preference accorded to freedom of expression appears indifferent to the
identity of the individuals who would try to protect their reputation or honor. Everyone
or everything is on the same playing field, regardless of whether they are employers,
225
employees (for example, seal hunters),226 doctors (particularly surgeons),227
22829politicians, or businesses.229
This orientation, sometimes akin to a kind of bias, has often been criticized in
doctrinal scholarship. 230 By exception, it seems, the court purposely based the superior
status accorded to freedom of expression on the existence of a hierarchy (or at least of
a hierarchical system). "[T]he Court cannot find that the undoubted interest of Dr R. in
protecting his professional reputation was sufficient to outweigh the important public
interest in the freedom of the press to impart information on matters of legitimate
political party. Id. at 76-83.
224. Giniewski v. France, App. No. 64016/00 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Jan. 31, 2006),
http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ (click "case-law" then "HUDOC," select "decisions" on the left-
hand column, and search for the application number).
225. See Fuentes Bobo v. Spain, App. No. 39293/98,31 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1115 (2001); Fressoz
v. France, App. No. 29183/95 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Jan. 21, 1999), http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ (click
"case-law" then "HUDOC," select "decisions" on the left-hand column, and search for the
application number).
226. See Bladet Tromso v. Norway, 1999-111 Eur. Ct. H.R. 289, 297-99.
227. See Kanellopoulou v. Greece, App. No. 28504/05 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 11, 2007),
http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ (click "case-law" then "HUDOC," select "decisions" on the left-
hand column, and search for the application number); Selist6 v. Finland, App. No. 56767/00
(Eur. Ct. H.R. Nov. 16,2004), http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ (click "case-law" then "HUDOC,"
select "decisions" on the left-hand column, and search for the application number); Tidende v.
Norway, 2000-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 371, 379.
228. Dalban v. Romania, 1999-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 221, 229-30.
229. Steel v. United Kingdom, 2005-I1 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 8-13.
230. See, e.g., G6rard Cohen-Jonathan, Abus de droit et libertis fondamentales, in Au




public concern.",2 31 Usually, the preference given to freedom of expression comes after
weighing the two conflicting rights against each other: protecting the reputation of
others weighs systematically less than defending the right guaranteed by Article 10(1)
of the Convention. Thus, individuals have become hostages of the legitimate public
interest attached to any general interest debate.
The overprotection conferred to the right of freedom of expression vis-a-vis the
protection of the reputation of others is, in any case, well on the way to being lessened
(indeed modified) as seen in some very recent jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court.
The court's change in attitude is all the more noticeable because it applies to the
reputation of a particularly controversial politician who occupies a position on the
political checkerboard described as extremist. 232 The decision is all the more
unprecedented (and unexpected even) because it does not make the protection of the
reputation of a political figure dependent upon the nature of his or her political ideas
(i.e., "good" or "bad" ideas)-the position expressed in the partially dissenting opinion
of the minority Judges Rozakis, Bratza, Tulkens, and ikuta.233 The enhanced prestige
of the protection of the reputation of others is an objective clearly stated by several
judges whose goal is not only to fight against abuses of the mass media, but also, and
perhaps above all, to include an actual right to one's reputation in the Convention,
which has a similar status to that of freedom of expression.23 4 Indeed, it seems
paradoxical that the Convention explicitly protects rights of lesser importance (such as
that of respect for one's correspondence), but marginalizes one of the main
components of such a fundamental human value as a person's dignity.
235
Likewise, it seems curious and even incongruous that the court, so ready to engage
in a more or less unchecked use of the doctrine of "living law" in certain cases, has
never established respect for one's reputation in independent fundamental law.
Textually, the protection of one's reputation is only one admissible ground for
restricting the freedom of expression. But this technical consideration (indeed this
obstacle) is far from being a determining factor as it concerns, among other things, the
manipulative interpretation of Article 4 of the Convention wrought by the court that
concluded on the applicability of Article 14.236 Upholding a right to protect one's
reputation is legitimate not only due to its fundamental importance in democratic
society, but also due to the transformation of the press, which has become, above all, a
business activity concerned about profitability and driven by the opinion that it is
answerable only to itself. Moreover, in its latest jurisprudence, the court for the first
231. Tidende, 2000-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. at 404.
232. Lindon v. France, App. Nos. 21279/02 & 36448/02 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 22, 2007),
http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ (click "case-law" then "HUDOC," select "decisions" on the left-
hand column, and search for the application numbers).
233. Id. (Rozakis, Bratza, Tulkens & gikuta, JJ., dissenting in part).
234. See id. (Loucaides, J., concurring).
235. The right to one's reputation and honor is recognized both by Article 12 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st
plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/8 10 (Dec. 12, 1948), and Article 17 of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 17, Dec. 16,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 177.
236. See Schmidt v. Germany, 291 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 24, 32 (1994).
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time clearly established the right to the protection of one's reputation as a component
of the right to respect for one's private life 237
ii. The Right to Respect for One's Private Life
The increased protection accorded by European jurisprudence to respect for the
reputation of others can be inserted within a more general movement to reinforce the
protection of one's private life and chiefly focused upon the intimacy of private life.238
But for all that, the freedom of expression is far from being systematically sacrificed in
the balancing act practiced by European human rights judges. The determining factor
of reconciliation between the two antagonistic rights resides in the contribution that the
publication or message makes to a general interest debate.239
To the extent that the notion of "general interest" or "public interest" debate is
relatively flexible,24 ° the court is in a position to rule differently depending on the
particular circumstances of each case. Freedom of expression wins out when
suppression of the attack on the political figure's privacy is based not on common law,
but on a specific provision protecting the official functions performed by the figure.
241
Protecting the intimacy of the private life of political figures gives way since the details
of the private life at issue are not completely separable from the public function
exercised.242 The same is true when the details of the private life of a political leader,
such as his or her financial status, interfere with the performance of his or her public
functions.243 Such a conclusion was at the same time upheld relative to the tax situation
of an important leader in the world of economics. 244 The conclusion was based on the
reasoning that contribution of this tax information belonged to a general interest debate
and would have belonged to it even if the economic leader concerned had not been a
person "known" by the general public. 245 Moreover, even for anonymous people, the
237. Pfeifer v. Austria, App. No. 12556/03 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Nov. 15, 2007),
http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ (click "case-law" then "HUDOC," select "decisions" on the left-
hand column, and search for the application number) (Loucaides, J., dissenting).
238. See Dreyer, supra note 85, at 639; Patrick Wachsmann, Le droit au secret de la vie
priv~e, in LE DROIT AU RESPECT DE LA VIE PRIVE AU SENS DE LA CONVENTION EUROPtENNE DES
DROITS DE L'HOMME 151 (Frederic Sudre ed., 2005).
239. Hannover v. Germany, 2004-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 41, 69.
240. See supra Part I.A. 1.
241. Cf Karhuvaara v. Finland, 2004-X Eur. Ct. H.R. 259, 270-77.
242. See tditions Plon v. France, 2004-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 39. In Editions, the state of the
health of a former deceased head of state, protected by medical confidentiality, became a
question of general interest due to the passage of time: "the more time that elapsed, the more the
public interest in discussion of the history of President Mitterand's two terms of office prevailed
over the requirements of protecting the President's rights with regard to medical
confidentiality." Id. at 72.
243. See Krone Verlag GmbH v. Austria, App. No. 34315/96 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 26,2000),
http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ (click "case-law" then "HUDOC," select "decisions" on the left-
hand column, and search for the application number).
244. See Fressoz v. France, App. No. 29183/95 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Jan. 21, 1999),
http://www.echr.coe.intlechr/ (click "case-law" then "HUDOC," select "decisions" on the left-
hand column, and search for the application number).
245. See Verlagsgruppe News GmbH v. Austria (No. 2), App. No. 10520/02 (Eur. Ct. H.R.
2009]
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protection of the intimacy of one's private life is relegated to the background from the
moment they are regarded as having made themselves known.
246
Inversely, the court gives precedence to the right to privacy when the message or
publication is considered not to make any contribution to a general interest or public
debate. Such is the case when contentious remarks relate strictly to the private life of a
political figure without any connection to his or her political mandate.2 47 Similarly, the
publication of a judge's personal notes used to prepare for his hearing before a
government investigative commission, which was to be made public and broadcast on
television anyway, seems outside the realm of a public interest debate. The information
provided in such a document strictly concerns the personal domain.2 48 The fact that
dissemination of the content of the judge's notes was likely to squelch public curiosity
was deemed totally irrelevant.249 In any case, the existence of a general or public
interest debate is not structurally linked to the notoriety of the person whose private life
is revealed. In fact, the court refuses to subscribe to the distinction made by Germany's
Constitutional Court between "absolute" and "relative" figures in contemporary history
and rejects the view that protecting the private details of a person from the first
category should be limited to publicly inaccessible places.
250
CONCLUSION
A panoramic approach to the Strasbourg Court's jurisprudence relative to freedom
of expression leads us to conclude the existence of two lines of force: on the one hand,
the structural promotion of the freedom of expression and, on the other hand, the
category-specific adjustment of said freedom. A more detailed reading reveals
distortions, indeed discrepancies, that are detrimental to the intelligibility and authority
of European jurisprudence. Judicial security, to which the court is so attached, is not
systematically guaranteed in freedom of expression litigation. Certainly, in part, these
observed or observable discrepancies are only provisional: they are due to the varying
methods of assessment used by the chambers of the court, which have not yet been
coordinated by the Grand Chamber, or are due also to temporary time delays between
the position of the Grand Chamber and that of one of the other chambers. But these
discrepancies can prove to be much less contingent. To this end, it would suffice as a
starting point to refer to the extent of control exercised by the court based on the
grounds upheld by the national judge.
Dec. 14, 2006), http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ (click "case-law" then "HUDOC," select
"decisions" on the left-hand column, and search for the application number).
246. See News Verlags GmbH v. Austria, 2000-1 Eur. Ct. H.R. 157, 175-76.
247. Tammer v. Estonia, 2001-1 Eur. Ct. H.R. 263, 277-82 (ruling that a conviction for
using discourteous terms against the wife of a political leader in reference to her conjugal and
family life did not violate Article 10 of the Convention).
248. Leempoel v. Belgium, App. No. 64772/01 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Nov. 9, 2006),
http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ (click "case-law" then "HUDOC," select "decisions" on the left-
hand column, and search for the application number).
249. See Prisma Press v. France, App. No. 66910/01 (Eur. Ct. H.R. July 1, 2003),
http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ (click "case-law" then "HUDOC," select "decisions" on the left-
hand column, and search for the application number) (regarding the publication of pictures in a
similar context).
250. Hannover v. Germany, 2004-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 41, 72.
[Vol. 84:809
THE ECHR AND THE FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
Sometimes it acts at the fourth level ofjurisdiction, while at other times it favors the
ancillary character of European control. The choice in favor of one or another modality
is the cause of debate within the court.25'
Among the rights protected by the European Convention, the right to freedom of
expression is without doubt one of the most sensitive to the political and ideological
stances of the judges themselves. A radioscopy of their individual opinions would
highlight the particular affinities of each of the judges. The fact remains that, in
corpore, they resolutely adhere to an asymmetrical jurisprudential policy. Adversaries
of the values of the Convention are far from being treated identically. Whether for
historical reasons or in order to conform to current trends, the court endeavors above
all to combat far-right extremism, which it correctly views as presenting the biggest
threat to values protected by the Convention. Nevertheless, bad-intentioned or
disgruntled minds might be tempted to link the court's relative moderation with respect
to far-left extremism to old political sympathies of some judges.
Although not specific to litigation revolving around the freedom of expression, the
court's appeal to the soft law of the Council of Europe has had particular import on
freedom of expression litigation for some years. It can most likely be explained by the
total convergence of existing views on numerous points against racism and xenophobia
held by the court, the Parliamentary Assembly, the Committee of Ministers, and the
European Commission. Thus, proceeding in such a way, the court contributes to the
effectiveness of purely declaratory or "recommendatory" norms.
By virtue of its richness as well as its anteriority, the body of case law elaborated by
the Strasbourg judge for nearly forty years has served as a source of inspiration for the
Luxembourg judge, without the latter automatically adhering to the methodology of
control upheld by the Strasbourg Court.252 Outside the European framework, this
jurisprudence has not necessarily been accepted as a reference model to follow or one
to blindly transpose. In any case, on occasion, some of its elements have been taken
into consideration, either explicitly or implicitly, by other international courts
monitoring respect for and compliance with human rights, such as the African Human
Rights Commission or the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.
2 53
251. Lindon v. France, App. Nos. 21279/02 & 36448/02 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 22, 2007),
http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ (click "case-law" then "HUDOC," select "decisions" on the left-
hand column, and search for the application numbers) (Rozakis, Bratza, Tulkens & gikuta, JJ.,
dissenting in part).
252. See Case C-274/99, Connolly v. Comm'n, 2001 E.C.R. 1-1617 (opinion of Jorabo
Colomer, Advocate General).
253. See GERARD COHEN-JONATHAN & J.F. FLAUSS, LE RAYONNEMENT INTERNATIONAL DE LA
JURISPRUDENCE DE LA COUR EUROPEENNE DES DROrrS DE L'HOMME 124-26, 163 (2005).
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